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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on human capital in Brazil.  
Chapter one examines the effect of the introduction of automatic grade promotion 
on student performance in 1,993 public primary schools in the Brazilian state of Minas 
Gerais. A difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation over time in the 
adoption of the policy allows the identification of the treatment effect of automatic 
promotion. I find a negative and significant effect of about 6% of a standard deviation. I 
provide evidence from quantile regression DiD estimates consistent with an 
interpretation of the findings as disincentive effect on student effort associated with the 
introduction of automatic grade promotion; additional evidence on student and teacher 
behaviour supports this interpretation. 
Chapter two provides a novel way of identifying peer group effects in Brazil. 
Students in Brazil are typically assigned to classes based on the age ranking in their 
cohort. I exploit this rule to estimate the effects on maths achievement of being in class 
with older peers for students in fifth grade using a regression discontinuity design. I 
provide evidence that heterogeneity in age (and in other characteristics) is an important 
factor for student performance. Information on teaching practices and student behaviour 
sheds light on how class heterogeneity may harm learning. 
Chapter three uses microdata from Brazilian vital statistics natality and mortality 
data between 2000 and 2010 to estimate the impact of in-utero exposure to local 
violence - measured by homicide rates - on birth outcomes. Focusing on small 
communities, for which it is more credible that local homicide rates reflect actual 
exposure to violence, the analysis shows that exposure to violence during pregnancy 
leads to deterioration in birth outcomes: one extra homicide during the first trimester of 
pregnancy increases the probability of low birthweight by around 6 percent.  
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Preface 
This thesis contains three independent chapters that are aimed towards contributing to 
our understanding of human capital accumulation in Brazil. The first two chapters are 
concerned with Brazilian primary education. The education system in Brazil underwent 
a major expansion in the last two decades and access to primary and lower secondary 
education today is almost universal. The rapid expansion of public primary education 
created challenges for schools and policy makers, including widespread grade retention 
and large age heterogeneity within student cohorts due to a combination of late 
enrolment, suspension of studies and grade retention.  
Chapter one looks at a policy aimed at reducing grade retention by automatically 
promoting students from one grade to the other. In the state of Minas Gerais automatic 
promotion was introduced in the 1,993 public primary schools gradually over time. I 
employ a difference-in-differences strategy that uses the variation in the timing of the 
adoption of the policy to estimate the effect of removing the deterrent of grade retention 
on standardized test scores. I find that the introduction of automatic promotion 
significantly reduces academic achievement measured by math test scores of 4
th
 graders 
by 6% of a standard deviation. Under plausible assumptions I argue for the 
interpretation of the results as the disincentive effect of the introduction of automatic 
promotion. I provide evidence that heterogeneity in age (and in other characteristics) is 
an important factor for student performance. Information on teaching practices and 
student behaviour sheds light on how class heterogeneity may harm learning. The 
chapter fills a gap in the literature by looking at the ex-ante effects of grade retention 
and helps to explain the persistence of grade repetition in many countries as means of 
incentivizing students. The findings are also important because they reveal that a large 
fraction of students is affected by the grade promotion regime, not only students that are 
actually retained. 
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The second chapter provides estimates on peer effects using quasi-experimental 
variation in peer group membership in 5
th
 grade classes of primary schools in Brazil. 
Primary school students are typically allocated to classes based on their relative age 
within their cohort, to make classes more homogeneous in age. Using the age rank as a 
continuous assignment variable, this rule creates a discontinuity in the allocation to a 
class and peer group for students close to the cut-off point. Focusing on schools with 
two classes per cohort I exploit the discontinuity caused by the assignment mechanism 
to compare outcomes of students on either side of the cut-off point. I find that marginal 
students who are assigned to the older classes have maths test scores that are around 
half of a standard deviation lower than those of students assigned to the younger classes. 
I provide additional evidence from variation across schools pointing to the importance 
of the difference in age dispersion between classes for explaining the estimated group 
effects. Complimentary outcomes from teacher and student questionnaires reveal that 
the class composition is also associated with behavioural differences of students and 
teachers in the classroom. The chapter provides a novel way of identifying peer effects 
using an assignment rule of students into classes that uses relative age of students. The 
results also contribute to the discussion on streaming of students into classes and 
schools and to the understanding of the effect of policies that aim at reducing the age 
variation in a given school cohort.  
In the third chapter (joint work with Marco Manacorda) the perspective on human 
capital changes from primary education to the time in utero. Using a very rich dataset on 
the universe of births and homicides from vital statistics data over the period 2000-
2010, we estimate the effect of in-utero exposure to homicides on a range of birth 
outcomes in small Brazilian municipalities, for which it is more credible that local 
homicide rates reflect actual exposure to violence. Identification is based on a 
difference-in-differences strategy across geographical areas and time. We find a 
14 
 
significant negative effect of exposure to violence during the first trimester on 
birthweight, which is line with findings on the effect of other stress-related shocks 
during pregnancy in the literature. We also find significant and large positive effects of 
homicides on the probability of low birthweight, implying that the effects are 
particularly pronounced at the bottom tail of the birthweight distribution. The results are 
largely concentrated among poorly educated mothers. This suggests that violence adds 
up to the mechanisms that affect the transmission of socioeconomic status between 
parents and their offspring. We provide evidence that violence in the first trimester of 
pregnancy affects birth outcomes through reduced gestational length, rather than 
intrauterine growth retardation. 
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1. Automatic grade promotion and student performance 
1.1 Introduction 
Grade retention, the practice of holding back students in the same grade for an 
extra year if they fail to achieve promotion requirements – either in the form of a 
performance measure or in the form of minimum attendance – is used in many 
developing and in some developed countries. It is particularly widespread and 
pronounced in African and Latin American countries, where repetition rates are often as 
high as 30% (UNESCO 2008).
1
  Historically grade repetition had a prominent role in 
Brazil and repetition rates in Brazilian primary schools reached 24% in first grade and 
14% in fourth grade in 2005.
2
   
Retaining students has important consequences both for the individual as well as 
for schools. Overall, every repeater has the same effect on school resources as enrolling 
an additional student at that grade and subsequent grades and either leads to 
compromising per pupil school inputs e.g. through larger class size or to a pressure on 
public finances through the additional demand for teachers, classrooms, desks and other 
inputs.
3
   
Opponents of grade repetition contend that it negatively impacts the retained 
individual by stigmatizing them and harming their self-esteem, by impairing established 
peer relationships and generally alienating the individual from school, which may in 
turn negatively affect academic achievement and increase the probability of dropping-
out of school (Holmes 1989). Furthermore, repeating grades delays entrance of students 
                                                 
1
 40 out of 43 African countries for which data is available in 2006 use grade retention (and for which 
average repetition rates exceed 4% in primary school) and 18 out of 23 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. 
2
 Data available at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx. UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, January 2012. 
3
 A very rough estimate of the annual cost of repetition on public finances in Brazil using average 
expenditure per pupil at primary schools in 2006 of $554 (in constant 2005 US$) and 18,661,000 students 
enrolled at primary school and an average repetition rate over all grades of 18.7% (not accounting for loss 
of students due to drop-out etc.) amounts to approximately 1.9 billion US$ (all data from UNESCO 
2008). 
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into the labour market which poses substantial monetary cost on students over the life-
cycle. In contrast, proponents argue that repetition can improve academic achievement 
by exposing low performing students to additional teaching and by allowing them to 
catch up on the curriculum and the content of teaching. This is particularly important if 
school absence for reasons such as illness in a given school year is the reason for 
retention. Grade retention may also help to make classes more homogeneous in 
achievement and therefore easier to teach by improving the match between peers in the 
classroom (Manacorda 2012). 
There is a small but growing literature on estimating the causal effect of retention 
on subsequent educational outcomes (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994, Eide and 
Showalter 2001, Dong 2009, Jacob and Lefgren 2004 and 2009, Manacorda 2012 and 
Glick and Sahn 2010). The results are mixed, with positive as well as negative estimates 
of the effect of repetition on academic achievement and school drop-out, and the results 
seem to depend critically on context and age of students.  
Considering these mixed empirical findings on the effect on repeaters, the use of 
public resources and the undesirable consequences for public finances, the persistence 
of grade retention regimes in many countries is puzzling. This is particularly the case 
for developing countries where repetition rates are often very high and pressure on 
public resources is large. Furthermore, repetition increases the age variation in the 
classroom and repeaters may also directly lead to negative externalities on their peer 
students (Manski 1993, Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser 2012). 
A possible explanation for the persistence of grade retention in many countries 
may be based on the deterrence effect of grade retention.
4
  Grade retention induces 
students to exert effort as it potentially inflicts substantial costs of repetition on low 
                                                 
4
 Manacorda (2012) is the first to point out such a deterrence effect of retention in the literature. A related 
argument of a deterrence effect is discussed by Angrist et al. (2002) in relation to school vouchers and by 
Jacob (2005) in relation to high stakes testing in the US. 
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performers. The ex-ante threat of retention may therefore incentivize students to study 
in order to avoid being retained. This incentive effect of grade retention may have an 
important effect on mean student outcomes, as it is not restricted to repeaters only, but 
may create incentives for a much wider range of students. While the empirical literature 
on grade retention focuses on the ex-post effect on repeaters, there exists – to the 
author’s knowledge – no research on the ex-ante effect of the promotion regime on 
academic outcomes of a wider set of students. This analysis examines the effect of 
removing the deterrence of retention rather than estimating the effect of repetition on 
repeaters. Automatic grade promotion has been introduced in Brazil on a large scale 
since the early 2000’s partly to accelerate progress towards meeting the Millennium 
Development Goal of universal primary education and to reducing the cost of larger 
student cohorts (UNESCO 2012). I exploit credible exogenous variation in the timing of 
the adoption of automatic promotion for identification in a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) setting.   
I find that the introduction of automatic promotion significantly reduces academic 
achievement measured by math test scores of fourth graders by 6.7% of a standard 
deviation. Quantile DiD results show that the strongest treatment effect can be found for 
the lower part of the test score distribution with considerably smaller effects in the tails 
of the distribution. This is consistent with an interpretation of the estimates as a 
disincentive effect of automatic promotion and the paper provides additional evidence 
in support of this interpretation. There is no evidence that the results are caused by 
teacher responses to the introduction of automatic promotion. Teachers are no more or 
less likely to assign and correct their students’ homework, and class size is unaffected 
by the policy introduction. Because there is only limited information on teaching 
practices available it is not possible to rule out completely the possibility of systematic 
teacher responses to the policy. The timing of the policy change limits the potential for 
18 
 
changes in the student composition of the test cohorts and I provide strong evidence that 
the socio-economic composition is unaffected by the policy and unlikely biases the 
estimates. There is also no evidence that the estimates are affected by systematic 
changes in student mobility across schools or by strategic test taking behaviour. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides 
information on the school system in Brazil and in the state of Minas Gerais. Section 1.3 
presents the data. Section 1.4 describes the natural experiment and outlines the 
assignment of schools to treatment. Section 1.5 introduces the empirical strategy. The 
results, their interpretation and falsification exercises are presented in section 1.6, and 
section 1.7 concludes. 
 
1.2 The school system in Brazil and Minas Gerais 
Primary school is compulsory in Brazil for children between the ages of 7 to 14 and 
consists of eight years of schooling (MEC 1996).
5
  Public schooling is free at all ages 
and enrolment in primary and secondary school is open to students of all ages.  
The Brazilian educational system has undergone substantial changes during the last two 
decades and has achieved considerable progress in expanding access to education. 
Starting from a primary school net enrolment rate of 85% in 1991, Brazil achieves today 
almost universal primary school enrolment with a net rate of 95% (UNESCO 2008). 
Primary school completion and youth literacy rates have improved notably, but the 
country continues to suffer from high repetition and drop-out rates.
6
  
The national conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família, formerly Bolsa 
Escola, which is a means-tested monthly cash transfer to poor households conditional 
on school enrolment and regular attendance among other conditions, plays a significant 
                                                 
5
 The school entry age has been lowered recently to 6 years and primary school has been extended to 9 
years. 
6
 The overall repetition rate in primary schools in Brazil in 2006 was 18.7% and the total drop-out rate for 
primary school 19.5% (UNESCO 2008). 
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role for the rise in school enrolment and attendance of school age children (de Janvry, 
Finan and Sadoulet 2006).
7
  
This analysis focuses on the state of Minas Gerais, the second most populous state in 
Brazil with an estimated population of about 19 million (IBGE 2007). Minas Gerais 
contributes 10% to the Brazilian GDP and is among the most developed states in Brazil 
(OECD 2005). The education system of Minas Gerais is among the most advanced and 
in national performance tests students regularly perform among the top (INEP 2007).  
According to state legislation, the State Secretariat of Education (SEE) has extensive 
authority to plan, direct, execute, control and evaluate all educational activities in Minas 
Gerais. Based on the far-reaching decentralization of education in Brazil, the SEE 
transfers authority to a large extent to Regional Authorities for Education 
(Superintendências Regionais de Ensino: SREs) and directly to the municipalities. SREs 
and municipalities therefore play a major role in the provision of schooling and the 
implementation of educational policies.
8
  Municipal schools account for more than half 
(56%) of all primary schools and state schools, that are directly under the control of the 
SEE, account for 22% of all schools. Besides the public provision of education private 
schools play an important role and account for the remaining 22%.
9
   
 
1.3 Data description 
This study uses data from two sources. Information on school characteristics 
comes from the annual Brazilian school census that is conducted by the National 
                                                 
7
 The conditionalities of Bolsa Família require a minimum school attendance of 85% and extend to the 
fulfilment of basic health care requirements such as vaccinations of the children and pre and postnatal 
medical consultations for pregnant women. Monthly per capita income in the household cannot exceed 
R$120 (US$57 in 2006) to remain eligible for the transfer. See Lindert et al. 2007 for a comprehensive 
description of the programme. 
8
 The installation of FUNDEF, a federal fund established in 1996 with the aim of redistributing state and 
municipal resources back to (mainly) municipalities according to student numbers contributed to the 
improvement of the control of municipalities over educational decisions. See de Mello & Hoppe (2005) 
for an analysis of FUNDEF. 
9
 There are also 28 federal schools in Brazil which are under the direct control of the federal government; 
the single federal school in Minas Gerais has not been included in the dataset. 
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Institute for the Study and Research on Education (INEP) under the control of the 
Federal Ministry of Education (MEC). The Brazilian school census compiles data 
annually from all primary and secondary schools in Brazil. The exceptionally rich data 
includes information on the location and administrative dependence of schools, physical 
characteristics (quantity of premises and class rooms, equipment and teaching material), 
the participation in national, state and municipal school programmes, the number of 
teachers and administrative staff, average class-size, detailed information on student 
flows (number of students in each grade by to age, repetition, drop-out and student 
transfer rates) among other information.
10
  
The school census also contains the information on the grade promotion regime of 
adopted in each school (grade retention versus automatic promotion), which is used to 
establish treatment and control groups.  
The second part of the data comes from the State System of the Evaluation of 
Public Education (Sistema Mineiro de Avaliação da Educação Pública: SIMAVE), 
which includes the programme for the evaluation of state primary and secondary 
schools (Programa de Avaliação da Educação Básica: PROEB).
11
  Results from the 
programme are used for the evaluation and design of educational policies in the state; 
the results are however not used by the schools to evaluate individual student 
performance, for example for the grade promotion decision. 
The main outcome variable is student achievement in state schools in Minas 
Gerais measured by math test scores in 2003 and 2006. All classes and all students in 
fourth grade of each school are examined and participation of schools and students is 
compulsory. The cognitive test scores are standardized to a mean of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100. In total 246,959 students have been tested in 1,993 state schools in 
                                                 
10
 Summary statistics for the public schools used in this analysis are presented in panel A of table 9. 
11
 Schools under the administration of the municipality or the federal government are not included in 
SIMAVE. 
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Minas Gerais. I use the repeated cross-section of test score data from 2003 and 2006 for 
this analysis. The students in the dataset have, as generally students in public schools, a 
deprived socioeconomic background. Almost half (45.6%) of the families with children 
at state schools in Minas Gerais qualify for Bolsa Família and can be considered poor. 
Information on sex, date of birth, racial background and on the socio-economic family 
background is also available from an adjunct questionnaire. Unfortunately, only the 
2003 wave of the socio-economic questionnaire contains information on parental 
education. Panel B of table 9 presents summary statistics on these variables. 
 
1.4 The General Education Act of 1996: the case of a quasi-experiment 
1.4.1 Policy background 
The General Education Act of 1996 (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional: 
LDB) paved the way for the introduction of automatic promotion policies in Brazil. 
Federal Law No 9.394/1996, which came into effect in 1998, regulates the 
responsibility for education between the federal, state and municipal level and 
facilitated federal and state programmes to control the grade promotion regime (Pino 
and Koslinski 1999). Section 3 of Art. 32 §1&2 formally distinguishes two alternatives 
for educational authorities to organize student progression: besides the conventional 
annual grade promotion regime the option of automatic promotion was introduced, a 
system in which students progress automatically to the next grade at the end of the 
school year. Between these two extremes, a mixture of both regimes was also permitted. 
In the mixed regime, schools define “learning cycles” that stretch over several – most 
commonly three – school years. During the initial years of the cycle students are 
promoted automatically. In the final year of a cycle students that fail to meet the 
minimum requirements set in the curriculum are retained. The idea behind learning 
cycles is to allow students an individual studying pace (Mainardes 2010). If students fall 
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behind their classmates they have a longer period to catch up on the curriculum. This 
particularly aims at reducing the long-run impact of negative temporary shocks, such as 
school days lost to sickness or adverse family events. For mixed regime schools that 
have adopted automatic promotion in learning cycles, grade retention is not entirely 
eliminated, but limited to the final year of the cycles. The LDB furthermore sets 
fundamental criteria on how to organize promotion under any one regime: In every 
school year a minimum attendance of 75% of all school days must be fulfilled as a 
general requirement for promotion, so that grade retention is still permitted if students 
fall below a 75% minimum attendance.  
According to the legal framework of the LDB the decision on the promotion regime and 
its exact specifications is taken on the state level. Automatic promotion was introduced 
at an early stage by the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Paraná, to some extent in 
the state of Pernambuco and by the federal resolution SE No 4, 1/98 in all federal 
schools in Brazil. A recent federal resolution disallowed retention for the first three 
schools years in all schools in Brazil from 2011. 
In the state of Minas Gerais the new regime has been established by state resolution No. 
8.086 in 1997. It stresses the autonomy of each public school in the decision whether to 
continue with the annual repetition regime or to introduce automatic promotion. In the 
year 2000 1,449 out of 1,993 state schools had established automatic promotion with 
two initial three-year cycles. At the beginning of the school year 2004 the remaining 
544 state schools switched to automatic promotion.  
  
1.4.2 Assignment to treatment 
Schools that adopted automatic promotion at the beginning of the year 2004 make 
up the treatment group and schools with automatic promotion (which have adopted 
automatic promotion since the year 2000) the control group. I focus on two cohorts of 
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fourth graders, which I call the test cohorts 2003 and 2006 for which test scores are 
available. Figure 2 presents an overview of these two cohorts and the change in the 
organization of promotion for the control and treatment group.  
When using this division into treatment and control group for comparison a sound 
understanding of the assignment process that leads to this division is essential. In the 
case of state schools in Minas Gerais the 46 regional authorities for education needed to 
propose a plan of implementation of automatic promotion for the schools under their 
administration. The decision for early adoption of the policy was made by each SRE in 
agreement with the state secretariat. The second wave was initiated by the SEE in an 
attempt to introduce automatic promotion universally in all schools. As the adoption of 
the policy is not randomized across schools in an experimental setting, treatment and 
control schools may not be balanced in the distribution of school and student 
characteristics. Although the identification strategy used in this analysis does not rely on 
the distribution of covariates being balanced, it is generally reassuring to find school 
and mean student characteristics of treatment and control group to be very similar. 
Table 9, panel A and B present descriptive statistics of treatment and controls schools 
for 2003 and 2006. T-tests (and Chi-square for categorical variable) for the equality of 
means between treatment and comparison group, accounting for clustering on the SRE 
level, reveal only very few small but statistically significant differences. As sample size 
is partly reflected in the t-statistics, it is more useful to look at the normalized difference 
          
  ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅̅̅
√    
      
 
 between means by treatment status as a scale-free measure of 
the balancing properties of the covariates (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). The 
normalized difference is small for all covariates and never exceeds the absolute value 
0.25,
12
 suggesting that treatment and control schools are indeed very similar in terms of 
                                                 
12
 This is a rule of thumb suggested in Imbens & Wooldridge 2009 to check the unconfoundedness 
assumption for the use of linear regression in estimating average treatment effects. 
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their physical school characteristics. Even more importantly, the normalized differences 
of mean student characteristics, which may indicate compositional differences of the 
student populations, are all very small and are far below the suggested rule-of-thumb 
value of |0.25| in both years. Apart from mean age, which differs slightly as expected,
13
 
no other variable reveals any considerable difference at the mean. The overlap in the 
covariate distributions can also be examined by looking at the distribution of the 
propensity score for the treatment and control group. Figure 1 shows the propensity 
score for the probability of treatment for the treatment and control group revealing 
substantial overlap in the multivariate distribution of covariates and a relatively similar 
pattern of the distribution of the propensity score for the treatment and control group.
14
  
In addition, I estimate a linear probability model to determine whether there are 
systematic differences between schools that have adopted automatic promotion at 
different points in time and to learn what observable school characteristics – if any – 
determine early adoption. The results are presented in table 14. The coefficients on the 
set of school characteristics are generally small and only very few are statistically 
significant. When including SRE controls even fewer variables show a significant effect 
and it is difficult to establish any systematic pattern. 
Given the similarity of treatment and control schools with respect to school 
characteristics and the student composition, it is plausible to consider the assignment of 
schools to treatment and control groups as conditionally random. 
 
1.5 Empirical strategy 
To estimate the treatment effect of the policy change I use a DiD estimator 
exploiting the variation in treatment status of schools over time, identifying an average 
                                                 
13
 Mean age is expected to differ as part of the treatment, which will be clarified in section 6.3. 
14
 A formal test under the null for the equality of the distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) of the 
propensity score is nevertheless rejected. 
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treatment effect on individuals in schools assigned to treatment. The double difference 
approach is capable of removing biases resulting from permanent latent differences 
between treatment and control as well as biases resulting from common trends over 
time. The estimation in a regression setup allows including additional regressors on the 
individual and school level to improve precision and to test for the presence of omitted-
school specific trends, in particular related to potential changes in the student 
composition. Identification requires that trends in student outcomes at treated and 
control schools would not be systematically different in the absence of treatment.  
Under this identifying assumption, I estimate the effect of the introduction of 
automatic promotion on test scores of fourth graders by the following regression model: 
 
                                                                (1) 
 
where Yist is the test score for individual i in school s at time t, ds is a school dummy 
which captures school-specific time invariant effects, dt is a time dummy which 
captures the common time trend of control and treatment group, dst is the 
time/treatment-status interaction term containing information on the treatment status of 
schools, that varies over time. γ in equation (1) is the coefficient of interest and reflects 
the average treatment effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on test scores of 
fourth graders. Zit is a set of covariates controlling for individual characteristics. Xst 
denotes a set of exogenous covariates for class and school characteristics, including 
average socioeconomic characteristics of students, detailed school characteristics,
15
  the 
participation in federal, state and municipal educational programmes,
16
 teacher 
                                                 
15
 Specifically, the covariates include initial (first grade) enrolment, number of teachers at school, number 
of total staff (besides teaching staff), dummy variables describing the type of the premises used for the 
school, dummies for the availability and number of teaching material (e.g. overhead projectors, personal 
computers, TV and video sets etc.), the availability of computer and science labs, school kitchen, the 
quality of sanitary units, number of class rooms in- and outside the school and dummies for whether the 
school provides all 8 years of primary education. 
16
 These programmes include National Minimum Income Programme, Free School Lunch programme, 
the provision of public school transportation, TV escola (a national education TV programme), other 
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characteristics and other.
17
  ε is a stochastic error term. Although non-random 
assignment of schools to treatment may lead to a correlation between assignment status 
and outcomes, this does not violate the common trend assumption as long as any 
differences that lead to the adoption of the policy are captured by the school-fixed 
effects. The common trend assumption may nevertheless be violated if selection into 
treatment was based on pre-treatment trends in school characteristics that differ between 
treatment and control. If, for example, schools with high performing students and low 
repetition rates adopt automatic promotion test scores and treatment status are correlated 
for reasons other than the treatment impact of automatic promotion. Unfortunately I do 
not have pre-treatment test score data to test directly for the common trend assumption. 
I nevertheless can investigate whether selection into treatment is based on pre-treatment 
differences in repetition rates. Table 10 reveals that pre-intervention repetition rates 
(from the 1997 school census before automatic promotion was introduced at any school) 
were virtually identical across treatment and control schools, so that there is little 
concern for self-selection of schools into treatment based on high or low repetition 
rates. The table also reports pre-treatment class size (averaged over grades 1-4) and pre-
treatment student-teacher ratio (averaged over grades 1-4). While there is small 
difference in class size of about one student, there is virtually no difference in the 
student teacher ratio and the normalized difference for both variables is well below |.25|. 
Classroom capacity constraints therefore were unlikely the driving factor behind the 
decision for early adoption.
18
  As I have pointed out earlier, the first wave of the policy 
adoption was initiated on the SRE level, which furthermore limits the potential for 
                                                                                                                                               
educational TV programmes, computer literacy programmes, and other state and municipal school 
programmes. 
17
 This will also allow accounting for eligibility specific effects (Ashenfelter 1978). This way the above 
time invariant composition assumption can be relaxed to accommodate for the case where treatment and 
control group are expected to differ in covariates that may affect the outcome variable. 
18
 Lam and Marteleto (2006) show that the demographic transition in Brazil in the 1990’s had a strong 
impact on student cohort sizes and enrolment rates in Brazil, but this does not seem to be relevant in the 
context of this study. 
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individual schools to select into treatment based on trends in test scores. The second 
wave was then determined by the decision of the CEE made for all remaining schools, 
so that there is virtually no scope for selection on a pre-treatment trend basis. 
As the treatment regressor varies at the school level and test scores of students in 
the same school are likely correlated, for example because they share the same learning 
environment and/or are from the same neighbourhood, conventional standard errors 
may be misleading as they do not account for the grouped error structure. The robust 
standard errors reported therefore allow for clustering on the school level (Donald and 
Lang 2007). 
 
1.6 Estimation results 
1.6.1 Main results 
The basic idea of the DiD strategy can be illustrated by a simple 2-by-2 table. 
Table 1 shows the levels and differences in test scores between treatment and control 
groups and the changes over time. The first row reports means before treatment 
(year=2003), when control schools were already under the automatic promotion regime 
and the treatment schools were still under the annual grade retention regime and the 
mean difference for the two groups. The entries in the first column reveal that schools 
that had already adopted automatic promotion have a mean score that is 7.05% of a 
standard deviation lower than schools that had not yet adopted the new regime in 2003. 
After the adoption of automatic promotion by schools of the treatment group this 
difference almost completely disappears and students at both groups have very similar 
average test scores and the difference in means is not statistically significant. Likewise, 
schools in the control group have very similar mean test scores over time with a 
difference that is not significantly different from zero. The lower right entry reports the 
simple DiD estimate, which can be interpreted as the causal effect of treatment under 
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the above identifying assumptions. The adoption of automatic promotion leads to a 
decrease in test scores of 6.65% of a standard deviation. Almost the entire fraction of 
the DiD outcome originates from the pre-treatment difference between control and 
treatment schools. After the adoption of automatic promotion in treatment schools the 
difference between treated and control schools almost completely disappears.  
This simple double difference can be amended in a regression framework 
following equation (1) to improve precision of the estimates and to be able to control for 
covariates and check the sensitivity of the estimates to their inclusion. Table 2 presents 
the estimates for different sets of controls. All specifications include school fixed effects 
and year dummies. School fixed effects capture stable unobserved characteristics of the 
schools and year dummies control for common trends in the test scores that are not 
related to treatment. Specification (1) of table 2 includes school controls, specification 
(2) controls for school and peer characteristics and specification (3) also includes 
individual level covariates. The estimates in all specifications reveal a stable negative 
effect of around 6% of a standard deviation and are very precisely estimated (1% level 
of significance). Adding school level and peer controls reduces the negative effect, but 
the reduction is relatively small. Controlling additionally for individual characteristics 
delivers estimates of virtually the same size as the simple double difference in table 1. 
The results reveal that the regime change from annual grade retention to automatic 
promotion has a significant negative impact on educational attainment on fourth graders 
in state schools in Minas Gerais. In the next section I will discuss the interpretation of 
the results. 
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1.6.2 Interpretation of the results and the disincentive effect of automatic 
promotion 
Table 3, column 1 reports the DiD estimates of the treatment on repetition rates 
for grades 1-4, following the tested cohorts of 2003 and 2006 over grades 1-4. The 
bottom entry for column 1 shows how the introduction of automatic promotion reduces 
the repetition rate in fourth grade by 0.086. Prior to the policy change, about 10% of all 
students in treatment schools repeated fourth grade, but only about 2% did so after the 
introduction of automatic promotion.
19
  In this analysis I am interested in understanding 
whether the estimated effect on test scores can be explained by the elimination of the 
threat of retention for fourth grade students. The two cohorts of students at treatment 
schools face indeed very different incentives from the grade promotion regime; while 
the 2003 cohort is subject to grade retention, the 2006 cohort does not face the threat of 
being retained.  
If the estimated effect is caused by a change in study incentives to avoid being 
retained, one would expect heterogeneous treatment effects along the test score 
distribution. Students in the lower tail of the distribution should be more heavily 
impacted by removing this incentive when compared to students in the upper tail, as 
these students should be less concerned about the possibility of retention. For that 
purpose I estimate equation (1) applying DiD to each quantile instead of the mean under 
analogue assumptions to the standard DiD (Koenker 2004, Athey and Imbens 2006, 
Firpo et al. 2009).
20
  Table 4 provides the quantile DiD estimates and reveals substantial 
differences in the treatment effect across the nine quantiles. The estimates range 
between -9.01 and -3.92 and are more pronounced in the lower half of the distribution, 
with the strongest effects centred on the fourth quantile. The effect of automatic 
                                                 
19
 Repetition rates stay above zero because repetition is still possible when failing to achieve 75% 
minimum school attendance. 
20
 Recent applications of quantile panel methods include Havnes and Mogstad 2010, Gamper-Rabindran, 
Khan and Timmins 2010 and Lamarche 2011. 
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promotion is much smaller for the top two quantiles and not statistically significant, yet 
still negative and non-negligible in magnitude. The inverse u-shaped distribution of 
effects is consistent with the interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect of 
automatic grade promotion, such that the treatment effect is largest for students left of 
the centre of the distribution close to the assumed grade promotion threshold and 
smaller for high performing students that are unlikely to be retained. Similarly, for 
students at the very bottom of the distribution the effects are somewhat smaller with a 
coefficient of -7.49 but still above the mean treatment effect. The slightly smaller effect 
at the bottom of the distribution could be explained by either a different perception of 
the cost associated with retention or the fact that grade retention is a possibility for these 
low performing students regardless of their effort.
21
  There is some suggestive evidence 
that automatic promotion indeed directly impacts the behaviour of students and reduced 
their study effort. Column (1) of table 11 reports the effect of the policy introduction on 
the propensity of students doing their homework.
22
  The DiD estimates show that after 
the introduction of automatic promotion fewer of the children do their homework (a 
decrease of 0.014); the coefficient is only marginally significant though. Interestingly, 
the change in the retention regime also changes the parents’ involvement with their 
children’s homework. Column (2) of the table shows that parents are more likely to help 
with their children’s homework (an increase of 0.022). This reveals that parents may 
well be aware of the disincentive from automatic promotion and they may try to 
counteract the potential reduction in their children’s study effort. If anything, increased 
parental involvement would however bias the estimates in table 2 towards zero, rather 
than explain the estimated effect. 
                                                 
21
 Separate estimates by socio-economic status as proxied by the number of books in the household do not 
reveal heterogeneous effects along that margin (results not reported). 
22
 All of the outcome variables in table 11 are based on pupil reported behavioural responses of 
themselves, their parents and their teachers and should therefore be considered more cautiously. 
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The distribution of treatment effects in table 4 is also consistent with an 
explanation based on changes in teacher incentives from automatic promotion. Teachers 
may for example focus less on students in the bottom half of the distribution if they 
previously cared about them being promoted.
23
  Information on whether teachers assign 
and correct homework may shed some light on potential teacher responses to automatic 
promotion. Columns (3) and (4) of table 11 report the DiD estimates for teachers 
assigning and correcting homework respectively. Both coefficients are very close to 
zero and not statistically significant so that there is no evidence that teachers respond 
systematically to automatic grade promotion.
24
 
 
1.6.3.1 Changes in the student composition 
For the interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect, any possible channel of 
effect of automatic promotion on outcomes – other than the disincentive effect – has to 
be precluded. Most importantly, potential changes in the composition of students in 
treatment and control schools over time could systematically lower test scores rather 
than the changes in incentives reducing the effort of students. Because there is grade 
retention in control and treatment schools in both periods at the end of third grade this 
leads to a positive selection of the students entering into fourth grade in both treatment 
and control schools and this mechanically limits the potential for changes in the student 
composition. In the section 6.4 I will discuss the implications of this in detail. 
Table 6 reports DiD estimates for a range of mean socioeconomic variables; for each 
outcome variable I have fitted a separate regression including school fixed effects and 
year dummies. Only the coefficients on the mean number of fridges per household and 
on mean age are statistically significant. All other indicators of the socio-economic 
composition are not affected by the introduction of automatic promotion, which is very 
                                                 
23
 Teachers may equally worry about the lost incentive for students and target their effort on the most 
affected students, so that a potential teacher response may go either way. 
24
 Section 6.8 looks separately at class size as another teaching input. 
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reassuring. While the coefficient for the mean number of fridges per household is very 
small and may be due to some spurious correlation, the significant reduction in mean 
age by about one month is more relevant and it is important to understand the source of 
this reduction in age and its consequence for the interpretation of the result. 
This reduction in age is caused by the difference in the inflow of repeaters in fourth 
grade at the treatment schools before and after treatment. Whereas treatment schools 
still received an inflow of repeaters from fourth grade of the previous year at the 
beginning of the year 2003, there was no such inflow of repeaters in 2006, which leads 
to the reduction in mean age, as repeaters are on average one year older. Table 8, 
column 2 shows the DiD estimate of the policy change on the net inflow of students 
from first to fourth grade and from first to third grade in column (1). Whereas the 
coefficient in column (1) is very small, negative and not statistically significant, the 
coefficient for the net inflow of students including the inflow of repeaters from the 
previous year at the beginning of fourth grade is sizeable, positive and very precisely 
estimated (column (2)). Looking at the direct effect of the inflow of repeaters on mean 
age of the cohort reveals that this almost exactly explains the age effect estimated in 
table 6.
25
 This means that the composition is altered due to treatment and it is important 
to understand the potential bias of the compositional change on mean achievement.  
Even assuming a positive effect of repetition on educational outcomes of repeaters,
26
 it 
is very plausible to assume that average performance of repeaters is still below the mean 
performance of non-repeaters in the test cohort, as repeaters are selected as the lowest 
performers in fourth grade in the preceding year.
27
 How does this differential inflow 
affect the outcome variable of interest? As there was an inflow of such low performing 
students in 2003, but not in 2006 the results for the disincentive effect of automatic 
                                                 
25
 Assuming that they are about one year older the inflow of repeaters at fourth grade leads to a decrease 
of mean age of the cohort of 36 days compared to the estimated effect on mean age of 39 days. 
26
 And a direct effect related to age, as repeaters are one year due to repeating the grade. 
27
 This is confirmed by the findings elsewhere; see Manacorda (2012) for example. 
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promotion are, if anything, biased towards zero and the reported coefficients in table 2 
(panel A) need to be regarded as a lower bound of the true effect. Unfortunately, there is 
no direct information in the student questionnaire on whether and when students were 
retained. I can nevertheless use individual age to single out repeaters to some extent. A 
regression sensitivity analysis that includes individual age as a control variable may 
give an idea about the size of the bias from the differential inflow of repeaters. Adding 
individual age to specification (1) leads to an increase in the negative effect of about 
20% to -7.97% of a standard deviation compared to -6.65 % without controlling for age, 
reported in panel B of table 2. Controlling for individual age in specification (2) and (3) 
leads to a very similar increase of 20% of the effect to -7.33% and -6.77%, respectively.  
An alternative way of investigating the importance of the bias for all specifications is to 
restrict the estimations to students that have never repeated by excluding all students 
outside the target age range of fourth graders. Once students from the additional inflow 
at fourth grade from the sample are removed, this leaves a sample of students that have 
never repeated.
28
 Panel A of table 5 reports the results for the same specifications as in 
table 2, but restricts the sample to students in the target age range for fourth graders. By 
restricting the sample in this way the coefficients exceed the estimates of the original 
full sample in all specifications by around 30%. The estimated effect is a further 11-
16% larger compared to the estimates in panel B of table 2. Restricting the sample to 
repeaters (panel B, table 5) reveals a negative effect that is considerably smaller and no 
longer statistically significant. The number of excluded students is nevertheless larger 
than what could be explained by excluding fourth grade repeaters only, as removing 
overage students from the sample also removes students that have repeated at third 
grade. As repetition is equally possible in all schools at third grade, the additional 
                                                 
28
 Nevertheless I cannot distinguish repeaters from students that have enrolled late at first grade. With 
rather strict enforcement of the enrolment age in Minas Gerais and the incentives to parents to enrol their 
children based on Bolsa Família conditions, late enrolment is nevertheless rather limited. 
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increase in the estimates is therefore not necessarily related to treatment. The increase 
rather suggests that the incentive of grade retention may have a different impact on 
previous repeaters compared to students that have never repeated a grade. The cost of 
repetition is likely highest for students that have not previously repeated. In contrast the 
cost of being retained again is smaller for previous repeaters, as they may already have 
suffered stigmatization and have already been separated from their original peer group. 
The difference in results for the restricted sample therefore may not only reflect the 
correction for the differential inflow of repeaters at fourth grade, but may also more 
generally reflect heterogeneous effects on repeaters and non-repeaters. 
A more comprehensive analysis of the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of age 
controls is provided in table 12. I present different specifications of equation (1) with 
and without controlling for individual age for the full sample (panel A) and the age 
restricted sample in panel B. The results support the previous findings. Adding 
individual age as control (columns 4, 6 and 8) strengthens the negative effect in the full 
and restricted sample for all the different specifications.  
Besides the direct effect on the composition, there may be an indirect effect on students 
of having repeaters in the class room. Repeaters may impose a negative externality on 
their peers because their achievement is lower or because they may be more disruptive 
in class (Lazear 2001). Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2012) elaborate on the extent of 
ability peer effects associated with repeaters and show that academic performance and 
behaviour of repeaters may be responsible for the negative effect. By adding peer age in 
the DiD specification I can control for potential peer effects from the differential inflow 
at fourth grade. Adding peer age as control only moderately increases in size the 
coefficients in specification 1 and 2 in panel C of table 2. Columns 2 and 5 in panels A 
and B of table 12 reveal that the inclusion of peer age only has a minor effect when 
controlling for other peer variables and does not strengthen the estimates of the 
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treatment effect suggesting that there is no noteworthy bias on the estimates. If 
anything, a negative peer effect of repeaters, as suggested in the literature, would lead to 
an underestimation of the effect. 
Conditioning on individual age and restricting the sample to non-repeaters reveals that 
the differential inflow at fourth grade changes the composition of students in a way that 
underestimates the true effect of automatic promotion by not taking into account the net 
inflow of repeaters into fourth grade in 2003. The size of the downward bias ranges 
between 20% and 30%. The estimates for the restricted sample should nevertheless be 
considered with caution, as the disincentive of automatic promotion may have 
differential impact on previous repeaters and non-repeaters.  
 
1.6.3.2 Introduction of automatic promotion at 2
nd
 grade 
Because of the introduction of automatic promotion in treatment schools at second 
grade of the cohort of interest, this potentially may also have an impact on the 
composition of students. Table 3 reveals how repetition rates from first to fourth grade 
of the theoretic test cohorts are affected by the policy introduction. The estimates for 
first and third grade show no effect of the treatment as expected. Rates at first grade are 
unaffected with the policy change occurring only in the subsequent year and rates in 
third grade are unaffected as the final year of the cycle remains with grade retention for 
both cohorts in treatment and control group. The estimate for the impact on the second 
grade reveals how the policy introduction lowers the repetition rate by almost 12% at 
second grade in 2004. The potential threat to the interpretation of the results arises from 
the fact that by introducing automatic promotion at second grade for the 2006 exam 
cohort, this cohort may be “contaminated” by low performers that would have been 
removed in the absence of treatment. The mean repetition rate for second grade at 
treatment schools drops from 12.8% (2003 exam cohort) to 3.1% (treatment cohort). 
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Rather than looking at second grade repetition only, in- and outflows in each grade up 
to the end of third grade have to be considered when examining the effect of the 
adoption of automatic promotion on the student composition. Looking at overall student 
flows of the test cohorts reveals that the negative selection has largely cancelled out 
when the test cohort enters fourth grade in 2006. In particular, repetition in third grade 
plays an important role here. The first column of table 8 reports the effect of the policy 
introduction on the net flow taking into account in- and outflows over grades 1-3. The 
net inflow due to the introduction of automatic promotion is very close to zero and not 
statistically significant. This is mainly based on two factors: Focussing only on 
treatment schools, table 13 shows that repetition rates at third grade actually increased 
by about 4.3% for the 2006 exam cohort, which filters out a substantive fraction of the 
low-performers already. Furthermore, third grade repetition rates for the two cohorts 
have to be compared with caution, as these may have a different impact on removing 
low-performers from the previous year depending on the inflow of students into third 
grade at the beginning of the year. Considering net-flows, the composition of 2003 and 
2006 cohorts are practically unaffected at the beginning of fourth grade. As mentioned 
earlier, the socioeconomic composition between the cohorts (table 6) is virtually 
unaltered by treatment, which supports the premise, that the policy introduction does 
not change the composition of students up to fourth grade. 
This is also corroborated by the fact that almost the entire fraction of the DiD result 
arises from the ex-ante difference between treatment and control group in 2003, rather 
than from the difference after treatment. The results for the simple difference over time 
of the control schools and the difference between control and treatment schools after 
treatment in 2006 are very small and not significant at conventional levels. 
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1.6.3.3 Effect of the policy change on drop-out rates 
The effect of retention on student drop-out has been studied elsewhere in the 
literature (see Jacob and Lefgren 2004, 2009, Manacorda 2012). If the introduction of 
automatic promotion has an effect on drop-out rates in grades prior to fourth grade, this 
may change unobserved student characteristics that cannot be controlled for. I estimate 
the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on drop-out rates in a DiD 
specification similar to equation (1) as                       (2), using 
aggregated data from the school census. Column (2) of table 3 reports the coefficients 
for each grade. Drop-out rates in second grade are unaffected by the policy change.
29
 
The treatment nevertheless has a small effect on drop-out rates at third grade, by 
reducing the rate by half a percent. This is equivalent to a mean reduction of 0.31 
students per school/cohort and presumably negligible in its potential impact on mean 
test scores. 
 
1.6.3.4 Effect of the policy change on school transfer rates 
Another potential source for compositional changes is related to student mobility 
between schools. Parents that expect a negative effect of automatic promotion on their 
children may for instance want to move their children to a school with grade retention. 
In Minas Gerais the possibility for switching public schools is limited as enrolment is 
mainly based on residence and a single public school often serves the local 
neighbourhood. Given very substantial fees at private schools it is also unlikely that 
parents move their children into private schools to avoid a specific grade promotion 
regime. As the policy was introduced while the cohort of interest was in second grade 
the incentive for parents to move their children is further reduced. To test for any effect 
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 First grade repetition rates are also unaffected as predicted, because the policy change only takes effect 
after first grade. This is a relevant observation as it shows that there are no anticipatory effects from 
schools to the introduction to the policy change. 
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of the policy change on between-school mobility I estimate the effect of the introduction 
of automatic promotion on student transfer rates using the same framework as in the 
previous section. Columns (3) and (4) of table 3 report point estimates for outgoing and 
incoming transfer rates that are close to zero and not significant for any grades, so that 
there is no evidence that student mobility has an impact on the student composition. 
 
1.6.3.5 Systematic test taking behaviour 
Although participation in PROEB is mandatory on the school and individual level, 
some students fail to attend the test.
30
  If the propensity to show up at the exam is 
related to the capacity of the student and to the treatment status of the school, this may 
bias the estimates. This might be induced by strategic behaviour of school 
administrators or teachers trying to manipulate the mean test scores of their school in 
the PROEB exam. If this is systematically linked to treatment status this could bias the 
estimates. Notably, individually identified test results are not available to the schools 
and PROEB test scores are not used by schools for the grade promotion decisions. I use 
information from the official student numbers in each school from the school census 
and compare these to the number of students participating in PROEB. I estimate 
equation (2) using the difference between the two figures as outcome variable. Table 7 
presents the results from the regression. The coefficient is very small (0.119 students) 
and not statistically significant so that there is no evidence for systematic absence of 
students from the test. 
 
1.6.3.6 Effect of the policy change on class size 
There may be other teaching inputs that could be affected by the policy change; 
for example a reduction in retention rates may affect class-size, which in turn may have 
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 The participation rate for the 2003 and 2006 wave of PROEB is around 95% as participation is strictly 
enforced and absence is only permitted in case of illness. 
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an impact on outcomes. There is a comprehensive literature on the effect of class size on 
student performance but the overall picture about class-size effects remains rather 
unclear.
31
  To rule out that the estimates are biased by an effect of the policy on class-
size I test for changes in class-size for each grade induced by the policy change for the 
cohorts of interest and column (5) of table 3 reports the DiD results. There is no 
evidence for an effect of the policy change on class-size in any grade, so that estimates 
on test scores are unlikely biased by treatment induced class-size effects. Even under the 
assumption that the introduction of automatic promotion releases other school resources 
that could be allocated to fourth grade students (for which there is no evidence in the 
present analysis) this would lead to underestimating the true impact of the disincentive 
created by automatic promotion.  
The fact that none of the above estimates (for repetition rates, drop-out rates, 
class-size, transfer rates) reveal any significant effect for first grade estimates is in itself 
an important falsification exercise. All these estimates are based on a placebo-treatment 
as the first grade of the 2006 exam cohort was not yet affected by the policy 
introduction. This also indicates that there are no anticipatory effects of the schools in 
respect to the imminent introduction of automatic promotion that may affect student 
outcomes at a later stage. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
Existing empirical work on grade retention has to date focused on analysing the 
direct effect of retention on repeaters. The focus on the ex-post effects may nevertheless 
neglect an important effect of the grade retention regime that works through incentives 
to study on a larger range of students than repeaters only. The introduction of automatic 
promotion removes the incentives linked to the threat of retention and in this paper I use 
                                                 
31
 See Hoxby (2000) and Angrist & Lavy (1999) for two prominent studies on class size effects. 
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exogenous variation in the timing of the policy adoption in public primary schools in 
the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais to obtain causal estimates of automatic promotion.  
Using a DiD approach I find a negative effect of about 6, 7% of a standard 
deviation, significant at the 1% level. Controlling for individual age strengthens the 
negative effect by about 20%, which gives an idea about the size of the bias associated 
with the differential inflow of repeaters into fourth grade before and after treatment. The 
estimated effect of the introduction of automatic promotion is of non-negligible size. 
Considering that automatic promotion may have a negative effect in several grades, the 
overall impact of the automatic promotion regime may lead to considerable loss of 
academic achievement over the eight years of primary school. Quantile DiD estimates 
yield an interesting insight into the distribution of effects. The quantile DiD estimates 
reveal that a large set of students is impacted by the policy change and not only the least 
performing students. The inverse u-shape of effects along the test score distribution is 
consistent with an interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect of automatic 
promotion. Some further suggestive evidence on student responses support this 
interpretation. Other potential channels, in particular related to changes in the student 
composition, can be ruled out. 
The estimation of a disincentive effect associated with automatic promotion closes 
a gap in the literature on the effects of grade retention and helps to explain the 
persistence of repetition regimes in many countries. Grade retention reduces internal 
flow efficiency at schools and is a costly policy, but may have a positive effect on 
academic achievement through a deterrence effect. Rather than focusing only on the 
effect on repeaters, attempts to assess the costs and benefits of grade retention therefore 
need to take into account the effects on non-repeaters as well. 
This is important in the light of the universal introduction of automatic promotion 
in all primary schools in Brazil that came into effect by federal legislation in 2011. 
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Although the Brazilian experience may not be completely transferable to other countries 
– often with lower repetition rates – the findings may nevertheless be relevant for 
countries facing pressures to meet the Millennium Development Goal of universal 
primary education and who may regard the introduction of automatic promotion as a 
suitable way to reduce repetition rates and increase school completion rates. 
 Table 1: Test Score Means in Treatment and Control Schools  
before and after the Adoption in the Treatment Schools 
 Before treatment After treatment Change in mean  
test scores 
Control schools 498.48 498.99 -0.51 
 (1.55) (1.51) (2.01) 
 
Treatment schools 505.53 499.39 6.14 
 (2.71) (2.59) (2.97) 
    
Difference in mean test 
scores 
-7.05 
(3.12) 
-0.40 
(2.99) 
-6.65 
(3.22) 
Notes: Mean outcomes for treatment and control before and after treatment. Standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering within SREs, are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Main Estimation Results and Sensitivity to Age Controls 
Dependent variable: PROEB math test scores 
Observations: 244,081, number of clusters: 1,993 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A 
   
Treatment effect -6.13*** -5.67*** -6.24*** 
 
(2.03) (1.98) (2.04) 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.17 
Panel B – adding individual age control 
Treatment effect -7.33*** -6.77*** -6.24*** 
 
(2.11) (2.04) (2.04) 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.17 
Panel C – adding peer age control   
 
  
Treatment effect -6.46*** -5.67*** -6.24*** 
 
(2.02) (1.98) (2.04) 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.17 
School fixed effects yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
School level controls yes yes yes 
Peer characteristics controls no yes yes 
Individual characteristics controls no no yes 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within 
schools, are reported in parenthesis. Specification (1) contains year dummies and school 
fixed effects, specification (2) additionally controls for a rich set of school characteristics 
(physical characteristics of the school and the class rooms, teaching material, teacher 
characteristics, participation in educational programmes etc.), specification (3) additionally 
controls for peer socio-economic characteristics at the school level and specification (4) also 
controls for individual characteristics. 
Table 3: Effect of the Adoption of Automatic Promotion on Student Flows and Class-size 
Dependent variable: 
  
Repetition rate 
 
(1) 
Drop-out rate 
 
(2) 
Transfer-rate 
outgoing 
(3) 
Transfer-rate 
incoming 
(4) 
Class-size 
 
(5) 
Grade 1  -0.010  0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.692 
   (0.010)   (0.003)   (0.007) (0.008) (0.363) 
Grade 2        -0.118***  -0.002  0.002 0.003 0.828 
   (0.010)   (0.003)   (0.006) (0.009) (0.422) 
Grade 3  -0.019      -0.005**  -0.002 0.007 0.502 
   (0.011)   (0.002)   (0.003) (0.009)  (0.416) 
Grade 4        -0.086***  -0.005  -0.007 0.006 0.252 
    (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.004) (0.008)  (0.336) 
Number of schools: 1993, years 2000-2006, average cohort size: 61.24 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%. The coefficients report the effect of 
introducing automatic promotion on the dependent variables for 1
st
 to 4
th
 grade using data from the school census 
2000-2006 following the theoretical test cohorts. For each grade a separate regression has been fitted estimating 
the effect corresponding to equation (1) as
0st s t st sty d d d       . The regression estimates are weighted by 
school cohort size and include year dummies (dt) and school fixed effects (ds). Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering within 46 SREs, are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Quantile Treatment Effects 
Dependent variable: PROEB test scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Quantile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Treatment effect -7.49** -8.44*** -8.53*** -9.01*** -8.54*** -6.82** -5.12* -3.92 -4.22 
 (2.94) (2.66) (2.63) (2.61) (2.66) (2.75) (2.85) (3.07) (3.58) 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. The coefficients report the quantile differences-in-difference treatment 
effects for nine quantiles of the test score distribution. The regressions include year dummies and school fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 
repetitions) adjusted for clustering on the school level are reported in parenthesis. 
  
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. The above samples exclude students that are below the 
target age range. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within schools, are reported in 
parenthesis. Specification (1) only includes year dummies and school fixed effects, specification 
(2) additionally controls for a rich set of school characteristics (physical characteristics of the 
school and the class rooms, teaching material, teacher characteristics, participation in educational 
programmes etc.), specification (3) additionally controls for peer socio-economic characteristics at 
the school level and specification (4) also controls for individual characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation Results for Restricted Age Ranges 
Dependent variable: PROEB test scores 
 Number of clusters: 1,993 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A – students in target age range for 4th grade 
     
Treatment effect -8.07*** -7.50*** -7.22*** 
  
-2.26 -2.23 -2.25 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.13 
Observations   149,223    
Panel B – repeaters (outside target age range) 
     
Treatment effect -3.42 -2.89 -3.29 
  
(2.50) (2.50) (2.42) 
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Observations   88,657    
School fixed effects yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes 
School level controls yes yes yes 
Peer characteristics controls no yes yes 
Individual characteristics controls no no yes 
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Table 6: Effect of the Adoption of Automatic  
Promotion on the Socio-economic Composition  
Dependent variables: Coefficient Robust standard error 
Proportion of white students  0.010 (0.008) 
Proportion of mixed students -0.009 (0.012) 
Proportion of black students  0.003 (0.005) 
Proportion if Asian students -0.004 (0.003) 
Proportion of indigenous students -0.000 (0.003) 
Mean age (in years)    -0.106*** (0.022) 
Mean male students -0.005 (0.007) 
HH wealth index  0.007 (0.025) 
Bathroom mean  0.018 (0.009) 
TV mean  0.004 (0.007) 
Video mean  0.007 (0.012) 
Radio mean -0.010 (0.012) 
Fridge mean      0.016**  (0.007) 
Freezer mean -0.014   (0.019) 
Washing machine mean  0.012 (0.010) 
Car mean  0.011 (0.009) 
Computer mean -0.004 (0.008) 
Books mean  0.026 (0.014) 
n=1993     
Notes: denotes ** significance at 5% level, *** significance at 1% level. All estimates refer 
to school means or proportions at the school level. All data is taken from the socio-
economic questionnaire of PROEB. For each dependent variable the effect is estimated 
separately in a regression corresponding to equation (1) as 
0st s t st sty d d d       . The 
regression estimates are weighted by school cohort size and include a year dummies (dt) 
and school fixed effects (ds). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within SREs, 
are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are weighted by school cohort size.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of the Adoption of Automatic  
Promotion on Participation in PROEB 
Dependent variable: difference between official student numbers and PROEB 
participation numbers 
 Coefficient R-squared within R-squared between R-squared overall 
 0.119 0.594 0.020 0.038 
 (0.976)    
Notes: The coefficient reports the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on the 
difference of the number of students according to the school census and the PROEB test. The 
effect is estimated by a regression corresponding to equation (1) as 
0st s t st sty d d d       . 
The estimates are weighted by school cohort size and include year dummies (dt) and school fixed 
effects (ds). Robust standard errors adjusted for 46 clusters (on SRE level) are reported in 
parenthesis.  
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Table 8: Effect of Policy Adoption on Student Net Flow 
 (1) (2) 
 
Student net inflow up 
to 1
st
 – 3rd grade 
Student net inflow including  
4
th
 grade 
Coefficient              -0.010      0.079*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
R-squared 0.55 0.59 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. The coefficients report the effect of introducing 
automatic promotion on net flow (including in/outflow due to repetition using data from the 
school census 2000-2006. A separate regression has been fitted estimating the effect 
corresponding to equation (1) as 
0st s t st sty d d d       for the two models. Model (1) 
refers to net flows including 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 grade, model (2) refers to net flows including 2
nd
, 3
rd
 
and 4
th
 grade. The regression estimates are weighted by school cohort size and include a 
year dummy (dt) and school fixed effects (ds). Robust standard errors adjusted for 46 
clusters (on SRE level) are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram for the Propensity Score (year 2003) 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 reports the histogram for the propensity score 
using all available data on school, teacher and student 
characteristics from the 2003 school census separately for schools 
from the treatment and control group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Treatment Scheme 
 
exam 
cohort    
PROEB 
test 
Grade  
1
st
 
grade 
2
nd
 
grade 
3
rd
 
grade 
4
th
 
grade 
Treatment schools 
2003 1 1 1 1 
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2006 1 0 1 0 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Control schools 
2003 0 0 1 0 
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2006 0 0 1 0 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Notes: Testing takes place for all pupils at the end of 4
th
 grade. The cohorts are 
denoted according to the year in which they are tested through PROEB. 1 denotes 
grades with grade retention, 0 denotes grades with automatic promotion. 
 
 
 
 
 
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Propensity score: cond. probability of treatment
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Table 9: Mean Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups in 2003 and 2006  
Panel A: Physical Characteristics and School Programme Participation 
                                                                  2003                        2006 
 Control   Treatment     Control Treatment  
n=1993 Mean      SD Mean SD P-value 
Norm-
diff Mean SD Mean SD P-value 
Norm-
diff 
Rural school 0.885 (0.319) 0.890 (0.313) 0.788 -0.011 0.885 (0.319) 0.895 (0.307) 0.544 -0.023 
State property 0.918 (0.275) 0.880 (0.325) 0.020  0.089 0.907 (0.290) 0.881 (0.324) 0.106   0.060 
Municipal property 0.062 (0.242) 0.093 (0.290) 0.035 -0.082 0.066 (0.249) 0.090 (0.287) 0.098 -0.063 
Private property 0.020 (0.141) 0.067 (0.161) 0.414 -0.220 0.024 (0.154) 0.027 (0.163) 0.696 -0.013 
School ownership 0.901 (0.298) 0.866 (0.340) 0.040  0.077 0.907 (0.290) 0.881 (0.324) 0.106   0.060 
Rented school 0.014 (0.118) 0.020 (0.140) 0.393 -0.033 0.010 (0.100) 0.09 (0.138) 0.164 -0.469 
Donated school 0.085 (0.278) 0.114 (0.317) 0.068 -0.069 0.082 (0.275) 0.100 (0.300) 0.261 -0.044 
Shared school 0.197 (0.398) 0.238 (0.426) 0.060 -0.070 0.197 (0.398) 0.197 (0.398) 10.00   0.000 
Principal office 0.875 (0.331) 0.858 (0.350) 0.324  0.035 0.865 (0.342) 0.874 (0.332) 0.625 -0.019 
Admin. office 0.909 (0.287) 0.937 (0.243) 0.036 -0.074 0.950 (0.219) 0.952 (0.214) 0.845 -0.007 
Teacher room 0.813 (0.390) 0.811 (0.392) 0.912  0.004 0.827 (0.379) 0.843 (0.363) 0.382 -0.030 
School kitchen 0.829 (0.377) 0.824 (0.381) 0.808  0.009 0.821 (0.384) 0.821 (0.384) 0.997   0.000 
Refectory 0.374 (0.484) 0.440 (0.497) 0.010 -0.095 0.412 (0.493) 0.464 (0.499) 0.046 -0.074 
Food storage 0.839 (0.368) 0.856 (0.352) 0.368 -0.033 0.732 (0.443) 0.718 (0.450) 0.533   0.022 
Computer lab 0.237 (0.426) 0.149 (0.356) 0.000  0.159 0.302 (0.460) 0.193 (0.394) 0.000   0.180 
Science lab 0.165 (0.372) 0.142 (0.349) 0.205  0.045 0.143 (0.350) 0.120 (0.325) 0.176   0.048 
Other lab 0.022 (0.147) 0.021 (0.145) 0.920  0.005 0.020 (0.141) 0.018 (0.133) 0.767   0.010 
Toilets outside 0.054 (0.227) 0.094 (0.291) 0.006 -0.108 0.0443 (0.206) 0.070 (0.254) 0.045 -0.079 
Toilets inside 0.980 (0.141) 0.967 (0.178) 0.150  0.057 0.992 (0.089) 0.981 (0.136) 0.101   0.068 
Freezer 0.899 (0.301) 0.920 (0.271) 0.144 -0.052 0.907 (0.290) 0.914 (0.280) 0.633 -0.017 
Filtered water 0.845 (0.362) 0.825 (0.380) 0.299  0.038 0.881 (0.324) 0.858 (0.350) 0.183   0.048 
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Video cassettes 1.757 (1.000) 1.763 (1.190) 0.911  0.000 1.501 (0.936) 1.551 (1.368) 0.444 -0.030 
TV sets 2.038 (1.066) 2.025 (1.324) 0.541  0.024 2.107 (1.021) 2.108 (1.353) 0.980 -0.001 
Projectors 0.851 (0.544) 0.858 (0.535) 0.815 -0.009 0.867 (0.545) 0.876 (0.530) 0.741 -0.012 
Printers 1.790 (2.200) 1.517 (2.040) 0.002  0.110 2.370 (2.295) 1.948 (1.961) 0.000   0.140 
Pentium computers 2.757 (4.866) 1.919 (3.915) 0.000  0.151 3.050 (5.053) 2.239 (4.435) 0.001   0.121 
386/486 computers 0.656 (2.486) 0.428 (1.469) 0.014  0.079 1.032 (3.109) 0.737 (2.249) 0.022   0.077 
Perm. class rooms 10.069 (4.857) 10.060 (4.343) 0.320  0.035 10.651 (5.439) 10.533 (4.403) 0.625   0.017 
Prov. class rooms 0.193 (0.581) 0.150 (0.456) 0.092  0.058 0.165 (0.459) 0.172 (0.516) 0.794   -0.010 
Class rooms  9.487 (5.188) 9.205 (4.195) 0.223  0.042 10.010 (5.255) 9.760 (4.198) 0.282   0.037 
Total staff 49.535 (30.385) 46.612 (25.796) 0.037  0.073 51.553 (31.624) 48.281 (25.749) 0.021   0.080 
Teachers 32.177 (20.045) 30.243 (16.885) 0.035  0.074 32.441 (20.651) 30.207 (16.330) 0.014   0.085 
Min inc. program 0.598 (0.491) 0.545 (0.498) 0.043  0.076 0.970 (0.171) 0.967 (0.176) 0.778   0.012 
TV escola 0.732 (0.443) 0.751 (0.432) 0.401 -0.031 0.495 (0.500) 0.564 (0.496) 0.008 -0.098 
Other education TV 0.237 (0.426) 0.304 (0.460) 0.004 -0.107 0.117 (0.321) 0.150 (0.358) 0.062 -0.069 
PROINFO 0.199 (0.400) 0.126 (0.332) 0.000  0.140 0.171 (0.377) 0.124 (0.330) 0.009   0.094 
State programmes 0.314 (0.465) 0.206 (0.404) 0.000  0.175 0.247 (0.432) 0.225 (0.418) 0.309   0.037 
Munic. programmes 0.091 (0.287) 0.102 (0.303) 0.449 -0.026 0.175 (0.380) 0.170 (0.376) 0.787   0.009 
School transport 0.527 (0.500) 0.487 (0.500) 0.118  0.057 0.722 (0.448) 0.668 (0.471) 0.025   0.083 
Initial enrolment 72.630 (52.326) 69.245 (50.132) 0.197  0.047 38.276 (30.966) 41.202 (32.187) 0.077 -0.066 
Classes in 1
st
 grade  2.537 (1.640) 2.359 (1.542) 0.030  0.079 1.682 (1.259) 1.766 (1.308) 0.215 -0.046 
Classes in 2
nd
 grade 2.410 (1.420) 2.425 (1.581) 0.854 -0.007 1.793 (1.295) 1.963 (1.324) 0.013 -0.092 
Classes in 3
rd
 grade 2.348 (1.428) 2.470 (1.567) 0.125 -0.058 2.163 (1.449) 2.123 (1.420) 0.587   0.020 
Classes in 4
th
 grade 2.334 (1.460) 2.469 (1.571) 0.080 -0.063 2.082 (1.289) 2.076 (1.314) 0.919   0.003 
Notes: The binary variables of school characteristics and programme participation are coded 0 for not present (no participation) and 1 for present (participation). All 
data is from the Brazilian school census 2003 and 2006. The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups 
(independent samples). As the sample size is sufficiently large the result for using a classical t-test or taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial 
distribution deliver very similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, approximate t using individual sample variances instead 
of the pooled variance and Welch’s approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used.  
The normalized difference is computed as             
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
, where S
2 
denotes the sample variance of Xi.  
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Table 9: Mean Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups in 2003 and 2006  
Panel B: Individual and Family Characteristics at School Level 
                                2003                                             2006 
         Control Treatment   Control    Treatment   
 Mean SD Mean SD P-value 
Norm-
diff Mean SD Mean SD P-value 
Norm-
diff 
Male 0.492 (0.500) 0.495 (0.500) 0.414 -0.004 0.490 (0.500) 0.498 (0.500) 0.028 -0.011 
Age (in months) 135.43 (14.53) 132.01 (12.72) 0.000  0.177 134.53 (13.73) 132.22 (12.46) 0.000  0.125 
% white pupils 0.302 (0.459) 0.333 (0.471) 0.000 -0.047 0.316 (0.465) 0.318 (0.466) 0.479 -0.003 
% mixed pupils 0.340 (0.474) 0.354 (0.478) 0.000 -0.021 0.420 (0.494) 0.428 (0.495) 0.021 -0.011 
% black pupils 0.118 (0.323) 0.121 (0.326) 0.125 -0.007 0.155 (0.362) 0.146 (0.363) 0.000  0.018 
% Asian pupils 0.034 (0.181) 0.034 (0.181) 0.935  0.000 0.045 (0.206) 0.043 (0.203) 0.250  0.007 
% indig. pupils 0.042 (0.200) 0.043 (0.203) 0.324 -0.004 0.046 (0.210) 0.046 (0.209) 0.001  0.000 
Bathroom 1.267 (0.560) 1.270 (1.291) 0.000 -0.002 1.263 (0.583) 1.276 (0.585) 0.001 -0.016 
TV 1.323 (0.792) 1.321 (0.773) 0.762  0.002 1.495 (0.788) 1.487 (0.775) 0.171  0.007 
Video 0.370 (0.483) 0.374 (0.484) 0.134 -0.006 0.606 (0.689) 0.605 (0.687) 0.816  0.001 
Radio 1.468 (0.796) 1.440 (0.790) 0.000  0.025 1.360 (0.752) 1.341 (0.738) 0.000  0.019 
Fridge 0.954 (0.468) 0.978 (0.468) 0.000 -0.036 0.995 (0.493) 1.002 (0.466) 0.054 -0.010 
Freezer 1.945 (0.228) 1.940 (0.237) 0.003  0.015 1.937 (0.242) 1.932 (0.252) 0.002  0.014 
Clothes washer 0.746 (0.435) 0.781 (0.414) 0.000 -0.058 0.924 (0.601) 0.944 (0.583) 0.000 -0.024 
Car 0.621 (0.855) 0.660 (0.862) 0.000 -0.032 0.641 (0.814) 0.672 (0.810) 0.000 -0.027 
Computer 0.170 (0.376) 0.176 (0.381) 0.022 -0.011 0.254 (0.435) 0.258 (0.437) 0.229 -0.006 
Books 21.867 (27.328) 22.070 (27.612) 0.311 -0.005 20.870 (27.850) 20.471 (27.664) 0.037  0.010 
Education (father) 6.318 (19.122) 6.577 (19.822) 0.000 -0.009       
Education ( mother) 6.487 (17.682) 6.651 (18.365) 0.000 -0.006       
Literate (father) 0.877 (0.108) 0.887 (0.100) 0.000 -0.068       
Literate (mother) 0.905 (0.086) 0.910 (0.082) 0.029 -0.038       
Notes: All data is taken from the socio-economic questionnaire of PROEB 2003 and 2006. Information on educational background and literacy of parents is only 
available in the 2003 questionnaire. The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As 
the sample size is sufficiently large the result for using a classical t-test or taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial distribution deliver very 
similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, approximate t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and 
Welch’s approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used.  
The normalized difference is computed as            
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
, where S
2 
denotes the sample variance of Xi. 
5
0
 
51 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Mean Pre-intervention School Characteristics in 1997 
1997      
n=1,993 Control  Treatment   
 Mean  SD  Mean SD P-value Norm-diff 
Repetition rate 1
st
 grade  0.08 (0.108)  0.08 (0.106) 0.98 -0.001 
Repetition rate 2
nd
 grade  0.16 (0.208)  0.17 (0.200) 0.37 -0.034 
Repetition rate 3
rd
 grade  0.05 (0.053)  0.05 (0.143) 0.63 -0.014 
Repetition rate 4
th
 grade 0.06 (0.072)  0.06 (0.093) 0.21 -0.044 
Class size (grades 1-4) 32.249 (5.871)  31.127 (6.480) 0.000 0.128 
Student-teacher ratio (grades 1-4) 20.480 (3.878)  20.129 (4.124) 0.244 0.062 
Notes: All data is from the Brazilian school census 1997. The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the 
mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As the sample size is sufficiently large the 
result for using a classical t-test or alternatively taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial 
distribution deliver very similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, 
approximate t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and Welch’s approximation of the 
degrees of freedom have been used.  
The normalized difference is computed as           
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
 , where S
2 
denotes the sample variance of Xi.
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Table 11: Responses of Students, Parents and Teachers 
Dependent variable:    
 
Students doing 
homework 
(1) 
Parents help 
with homework 
(2) 
Teacher assigns 
homework 
(3) 
Teacher corrects 
homework 
(4) 
 
-0.014* 0.022*** -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
Observations 217,253 212,647 220,087 215,809 
R-squared 0.003 0.041 0.001 0.003 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, * denotes significance at 10%. Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering within schools are reported in parenthesis. The coefficients report the effect of the introduction of 
automatic promotion behavioural responses of students, parents and teachers. The effects are estimated by a 
regression corresponding to equation (1) as                       . The binary outcome variables 
were constructed using consistent information from the socio-economic questionnaire of PROEB 2003 and 
2006. The dependent variable in column (1) reports change in fraction of students always doing their 
homework (mean 0.706), in column (2) the change in fraction of students always receiving help from their 
parents with their homework (mean 0.652), in column (3) the change in fraction of teachers assigning 
homework (mean 0.981), and in column (4) the change in fraction of teachers always correcting homework 
of their students (mean 0.767). 
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Table 12: Sensitivity of Estimates to Individual and Peer Age Controls for Different Age Ranges 
Dependent variable: PROEB test scores 
Panel A – all pupils  
 Peer controls Peer and individual controls Individual controls 
 
excl. 
peer age 
incl. 
peer age 
excl. ind. and 
peer age 
incl. ind. age, 
excl. peer age 
incl. peer age, 
excl. ind. age 
incl. peer 
and ind. age 
excl. ind. 
age 
incl. ind. 
age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 
effect -5.65*** -5.67*** -6.02*** -6.47*** -5.78*** -6.24*** -6.76*** -6.87*** 
 (1.98) (1.98) (1.98) (2.04) (1.99) (2.04) (1.96) (2.08) 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.16 
Observations: 244,081 
Panel B – students in target age range for 4th grade  
 Peer controls Peer and individual controls Individual controls 
 
excl. peer 
age 
incl. 
peer age 
excl. ind. and 
peer age 
incl. ind. age, 
excl. peer age 
incl. peer age, 
excl. ind. age 
incl. peer 
and ind. age 
excl. ind. 
age 
incl. ind. 
age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 
effect -7.47*** -7.50*** -7.30*** -7.46*** -7.11*** -7.22*** -7.73*** -7.96*** 
 (2.23) (2.23) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.26) (2.26) 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Observations: 149,223 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. All estimates include controls for school characteristics (physical characteristics of the school and the class 
rooms, teaching material, teacher characteristics, participation in educational programmes etc.) The specifications (1) include additionally controls 
for peer socio-economic characteristics, specifications (2) control for per and individual characteristics, specifications (3) control for individual 
characteristics. The row below specifies further controls for individual and peer age in the estimation. 
5
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Table 13: Effect of Policy Adoption on 3rd Grade  
Repetition Rate for Treatment Schools 
 3
rd
 grade repetition 
Coefficient       0.0428*** 
 (0.0099) 
R-squared                                       0.019 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. The coefficient reports the effect of introducing 
automatic promotion on 3
rd
 grade repetition rate for the cohort of interest of treatment 
schools. 
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Table 14: Linear Probability Model of Assignment to Treatment  
 (1) (2) 
School provides all years of fundamental edu.      0.061** (0.030)      0.067** (0.027) 
School 
characteristics rural school  0.004 (0.039)  0.001 (0.036) 
 proper school building  0.070 (0.099)  0.100 (0.099) 
 church building      -0.152** (0.070) -0.128 (0.076) 
 teacher home  -0.156 (0.175) -0.289 (0.170) 
 building of other school   0.013 (0.061) -0.016 (0.053) 
 farm building -0.111 (0.120) -0.037 (0.113) 
 other building -0.107 (0.059)     -0.119** (0.053) 
 state property -0.271 (0.240) -0.130 (0.233) 
 municipal property -0.380 (0.233) -0.210 (0.229) 
 private property -0.348 (0.237) -0.227 (0.227) 
 school property -0.061 (0.070) -0.076 (0.059) 
 rented property 0.034 (0.109)  0.045 (0.097) 
 shared school -0.038 (0.023)     -0.052** (0.021) 
 principal office  0.007 (0.033) -0.023 (0.030) 
 secretarial office -0.067 (0.042)     -0.083** (0.040) 
 school library -0.008 (0.030)  0.016 (0.027) 
 reading room -0.029 (0.052) -0.087 (0.046) 
 teacher room -0.004 (0.030) -0.001 (0.027) 
 video library -0.031 (0.041) -0.050 (0.039) 
 TV room  0.006 (0.024)  0.021 (0.022) 
 school kitchen  0.016 (0.029) -0.018 (0.027) 
 cafeteria  0.008 (0.024)   0.011 (0.021) 
 refectory     -0.045** (0.021) -0.023 (0.020) 
 stationary -0.025 (0.024)   0.003 (0.022) 
 computer laboratory  0.017 (0.042)   0.012 (0.039) 
 science laboratory  0.011 (0.031)   0.003 (0.029) 
 other laboratory  0.018 (0.061) -0.005 (0.053) 
 toilets outside school     -0.088** (0.036) -0.053 (0.033) 
 toilets inside school  0.023 (0.055) -0.013 (0.052) 
 toilets ready for special needs  0.108 (0.083)   0.144 (0.076) 
 school ready for special needs -0.062 (0.071) -0.022 (0.062) 
 industrial oven  0.021 (0.089)   0.056 (0.088) 
 home oven -0.022 (0.030) -0.009 (0.029) 
 wood oven  0.052 (0.048)   0.016 (0.037) 
 freezer -0.052 (0.038) -0.056 (0.034) 
 filtered water      0.051** (0.026) -0.007 (0.024) 
 internet access  0.017 (0.033) -0.012 (0.030) 
 public energy supply -0.044 (0.247) -0.049 (0.162) 
 solar energy       -0.229*** (0.071) -0.100 (0.086) 
 using 220 volt  -0.020 (0.040) -0.008 (0.037) 
 using 110 & 220 volt      -0.063** (0.029) -0.010 (0.029) 
 public water supply -0.025 (0.089)  0.061 (0.077) 
 artesian well -0.082 (0.086)  0.003 (0.076) 
 cistern water -0.003 (0.073) -0.021 (0.063) 
 no running water -0.093 (0.250) -0.075 (0.267) 
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 spring water -0.060 (0.105) -0.034 (0.093) 
Table 14 continued 
 public sewerage  0.055 (0.303)  0.125 (0.240) 
 septic tank -0.070 (0.303)  0.098 (0.241) 
 no sewerage  0.121 (0.319)  0.135 (0.250) 
Number of  video tapes -0.012 (0.014) -0.010 (0.013) 
 TV sets -0.006 (0.012) -0.004 (0.012) 
 printers -0.001 (0.009)  0.002 (0.008) 
 overhead projectors     -0.043** (0.021) -0.015 (0.020) 
 Pentium computers 0.008 (0.004)  0.004 (0.004) 
 386/486 computers      0.013** (0.006)      0.013** (0.006) 
 permanent class rooms -0.015 (0.009) -0.007 (0.008) 
 provisory class rooms  0.019 (0.023)  0.015 (0.022) 
 class rooms in school  0.017 (0.010)  0.013 (0.009) 
 class rooms away from school  0.030 (0.015)  0.023 (0.013) 
School size  student enrolment 1st year -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
 total number of staff  0.000 (0.003)  0.002 (0.003) 
 total number of teachers  0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 
 number of teachers in classes 1-4 -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Programme  Minimum Income Programme  0.012 (0.020)  0.004 (0.022) 
participation TV escola -0.007 (0.024)  0.012 (0.023) 
 Education TV   -0.040* (0.022) -0.013 (0.021) 
 Parameters in Action -0.045 (0.028) -0.025 (0.027) 
 FNDE   0.005 (0.025) -0.025 (0.025) 
 Ouvebem     -0.061** (0.028) -0.025 (0.026) 
 Reabvis -0.025 (0.027) -0.007 (0.025) 
 School Transport Programme        0.074*** (0.027)  0.021 (0.027) 
 National Library Programme -0.025 (0.021) -0.006 (0.019) 
 State computer programme  0.038 (0.062)  0.043 (0.059) 
 Municipal computer programme  0.213 (0.179)  0.153 (0.170) 
 Proinfo   0.023 (0.039)  0.058 (0.036) 
 other state programme        0.104*** (0.025)  0.008 (0.024) 
 other municipal programme -0.039 (0.032)     -0.068** (0.031) 
 Free School Lunch  0.047 (0.170)  0.007 (0.181) 
 Free Public School Transport -0.035 (0.024)  0.007 (0.022) 
 Constant  0.634 (0.504)  0.807 (0.440) 
Observations  1993 
SRE dummies  No         Yes 
R-squared  0.09         0.28 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Specification (2) includes regional school administration dummies (SRE). Most of the physical characteristics 
describing the schools are indicator variables on the presence at school. Similarly, indicator variables inform about 
participation in education programmes. The programme Parameters in Action is a federal programme for the 
professional development of teachers; FNDE denotes a maintenance and development programme for education 
by the National Fund for the Development of Education, Ouvebem is a national campaign for the importance of the 
sense of hearing, Reabvis is a national campaign on visual rehabilitation, PROINFO is a federal computer literacy 
programme. This table reports the coefficients from two specifications of a linear model of the effect of school 
characteristics on the probability for treatment. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero for being in 
treatment group and equals 1 for being in the control group. None of the coefficients of the linear model produces 
values outside the unit-interval and a logit specification delivers very similar results to the linear specification 
diminishing doubts on the suitability of the linear specification (not reported). 
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2. Class Assignment and Peer Group Effects 
2. 1 Introduction 
The question of whether the composition of the peer group matters for the outcome of 
an individual member of the group has received considerable attention in numerous 
contexts where social interactions can be present. Peer effects have been studied in the 
context of schools, universities, workplaces, neighbourhoods and prisons, among 
others.
32
 Due to the natural grouping of students into schools and classrooms, and the 
potential for education policies to affect the peer group composition, peer effects in 
education have received extensive attention by economists. Recent work goes beyond 
linear-in-means specifications and points to the potential relevance of the distribution of 
peer characteristics in explaining group effects (Hoxby and Weingarth 2006, Lyle 
2009). 
The identification of group effects is challenging due to conceptual problems as 
well as data limitations. In the education sphere, for example, an identification strategy 
for peer effects needs to address potential endogenous selection of students into schools 
and classes. With selection into groups, unobserved characteristics such as ability, 
parental support or students’ effort are likely to be correlated among peers, and 
educational outcomes are therefore correlated within the peer group even in the absence 
of externalities. In addition, the analysis needs to deal with separating peer effects from 
                                                 
32
 Recent studies include Mas and Moretti (2009) on productivity effects for supermarket cashiers; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010) on social networks and worker productivity in farm production; 
Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009) on the effect of juvenile offenders’ serving time on other's 
subsequent criminal behaviour to name just a few. Studies on peer effects in education include Hoxby 
(2000) for gender and race peer effects; Hanushek et al. (2003) provide a framework for estimating peer 
effects trying to overcome omitted variables and simultaneous equation biases; Duflo, Dupas and Kremer 
(2010) provide evidence from a randomized experiment in Kenya; Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2008) 
on ability peer effects and potential channels; Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt (2009) on distributional effects 
of ability peer effects; Lavy and Schlosser (2011) on gender peer effects and their operational channels; 
Zimmerman (2003) and Sacerdote (2003) for peer effects in college education; Angrist and Lang (2004) 
for peer effects on racial integration and Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) for a cross-country 
comparison of peer effects at primary school level. Student tracking, school choice, busing, admission 
policies, class formation, repetition policies, and residential location decisions are relevant policy issues 
that can change the peer composition in schools and classrooms (Zimmerman 2003 and Hanushek et. al 
2003). 
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common shocks to the peer group, such as differential educational and teacher inputs, 
and it needs to account for simultaneous determination of student and peer achievement 
(Manski 1993, Hanushek et al. 2003).  
Randomized experiments are the first choice for overcoming the selection 
problem and there are a number of recent applications in this area (see Duflo, Dupas and 
Kremer (2011) on ability grouping in primary schools, and Whitmore (2005) on gender 
peer effects in higher education, Carrell et al. 2009 on peer effects in higher education 
and Carrell et al. 2013 on the endogenous formation of peer subgroups). Empirical 
strategies that exploit natural experiments, such as conditional random assignment of 
college roommates by Zimmerman (2003) and Sacerdote (2003), or the idiosyncratic 
variation in the composition of a given cohort over time have also been used (Hoxby, 
2000, Ammermueller and Pischke 2009, Gibbons and Telhaj 2012, Ohinata and van 
Ours 2013). There is little experimental or quasi-experimental evidence that overcomes 
the identification problems of peer group effects in primary or secondary education and 
even less evidence that specifically considers distributional features of peer groups that 
might affect educational achievement.  
Group heterogeneity has not received much attention in the literature on peer 
effects. It has though been addressed in the literature on tracking (also referred to as 
streaming), where students are separated by academic ability into schools or classes.
33
 
Some recent research on the effects of tracking that addresses the endogeneity of 
tracking decisions, finds that tracking may benefit equally students from lower and 
higher achievement tracks. Figlio and Page (2002) show that tracking may actually help 
low-ability students without proposing a specific mechanism for this effect and Zimmer 
(2003) presents quasi-experimental evidence that a negative direct peer effect for low-
                                                 
33
 There is an extensive pedagogic literature on age, ability grouping, and academic tracking. See 
Robinson (2008), Adams-Byers, Squiller Whitsell and Moon (2004), and Betts and Shkolnik (1999) for 
some recent examples. Kremer (1997) provides an economic model of sorting. 
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achieving students is offset by the positive effects of achievement targeted instruction. 
Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011) use quasi-experimental assignment of pupils to classes 
to study the effect of tracking students on initial achievement among Kenyan primary 
school students. They find persistent positive effects across the achievement distribution 
of tracking students in a higher and a lower ability class. They attribute this effect 
mainly to teacher effort and the choice of target teaching level given the particular 
incentives for teachers in Kenyan schools, and the better match of the instruction level 
due to reduced heterogeneity in ability in the classrooms. Their results are matched by 
the findings of Zimmer (2003) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) who show that 
students in more homogenous classes benefit from more tailored instruction. De Giorgi, 
Pellizzari and Woolston (2010) provide evidence on the effect of class heterogeneity on 
academic achievement and labour market outcomes in the setting of higher education. 
They find that the effect of the peer distribution on student performance is non-linear 
and appears to be inverse U-shaped with respect to the dispersion of gender and ability 
in the group. 
This chapter provides a novel method to identify peer effects in education and 
quasi-experimental evidence from exogenous variation in peer group membership by 
using an assignment mechanism of students into classes which provides the basis for a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design. Brazilian primary school students are typically 
allocated to classes based on their relative age in the cohort. Using the age rank as a 
continuous assignment variable, this rule creates a discontinuity in the allocation to a 
class (peer group) for students close to the class size cap of the relatively younger class. 
I exploit this rule to compare outcomes of students at the margin of being assigned to an 
older versus a younger group in schools with two classes per cohort. The present setting 
differs from the settings in most of the literature where identification relies on small 
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differences in peer characteristics from idiosyncratic variation across cohorts or from 
variation based on random assignment.
34
   
Using two-stage-least squares to estimate the discontinuity in a fuzzy RD setting, 
I find strong evidence for sizeable peer group effects. I estimate a negative effect from 
being in the relatively older class on maths test scores among students in fifth grade of 
around half of a standard deviation. 
A major challenge in the present context is that the discontinuity cut-off - i.e. the 
size of the younger class - is potentially endogenous. If students are strategically 
allocated to classes based on their latent outcomes, variation in outcomes around the 
threshold is not ‘as good as random’ and differences in outcomes between those on the 
right and on the left of the cut-off do not provide a consistent estimate of the parameter 
of interest (Lee and Lemieux 2010). In the chapter, though, I argue that assignment to 
the groups is largely predetermined (in 1
st
 grade) and I find no evidence, based on a 
large array of observable covariates, of non-random sorting around the cut-off.
35
 
Because I have data on more than 350 schools, I am able to estimate a separate 
parameter for each school and relate the magnitude of the estimated coefficient to 
differences in exogenous class characteristics across schools. This strategy allows me to 
learn about which observable differences across classes, if any, drive the estimated gap 
in the attainment between barely eligible and barely ineligible pupils. Because, in 
Brazil, as in many other low- and middle-income countries, grade repetition is 
widespread, older classes tend typically to display larger variation in age. I find 
evidence that the estimated group effect may be due to the difference in the age 
dispersion across classes. 
                                                 
34
 Carrell et al. 2013 is an exception to this. 
35
 Appendix A2 provides information on the initial assignment of students and the transition from one 
grade to the following grade. 
61 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly 
describes the Brazilian educational system and the educational system in the state of 
Minas Gerais, which is the focus of this study. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 
2.4 presents the assignment mechanism of students to classes and introduces the 
identification strategy. Section 2.5 presents the main results and Section 6 presents tests 
for non-random sorting and for correlated effects. Section 2.7 gives an interpretation of 
the peer group estimates and Section 2.8 concludes. 
 
2.2. The allocation of students into classes in Minas Gerais 
In the public schools of Minas Gerais, which are the focus of this analysis, 
“normal” class size is set at 25 students per class.36 When enrolment per grade is above 
25 pupils, the school administration needs to make a choice on how to assign students to 
classes before the start of the school year. As, unlike innate ability or behavioural 
characteristics, age of students at the point of enrolment in first grade can be easily 
observed by school administrators, age sorting provides a convenient and widely used 
way of grouping students utilising observable characteristics at the time of entry into 
primary school.
37
 
Students who progress regularly typically remain in their original class throughout 
primary school, so that, other than because of migration between schools and drop-out, 
assignment to classes is largely predetermined in first grade and not based on students’ 
observable characteristics other than age.
38
 Obviously, grade repetition may potentially 
lead to changes in the original class assignment. Although grade repetition has been 
                                                 
36
 Law 16.056 of 24
th
 April 2006 limits class size to 25 students in the initial years of primary education 
(1
st
-5
th
 grade) in all public schools in Minas Gerais. Exceptions are theoretically only allowed under 
special circumstances and during the transitional period of the introduction of the law.  
http://crv.educacao.mg.gov.br/sistema_crv/banco_objetos_crv/%7B103FA0DB-B47A-4E66-A719-
402B21F94D5B%7D_lei%2016056%202006.pdf 
37
 Grouping students according to their age may in fact at least partially coincide with grouping according 
to ability, as ability is likely to be correlated with age at time of primary school enrolment. See Cascio 
and Whitmore Schanzenbach (2007) and Angrist and Krueger (1991) for a discussion of student age and 
educational outcomes. 
38
 The appendix A2 provides more information on the initial assignment of students. 
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reduced by the introduction of automatic grade promotion in Minas Gerais which 
chapter one is concerned about, Table 15 reveals that there still exists a substantial 
number of students who have repeated at least one school grade.
39
 Grade repeaters in 
first grade are, consistent with an assignment rule based on the age ranking of students 
in the cohort, usually allocated to the older class when repeating the grade in the 
following year. In succeeding grades, repeaters regularly are allocated to the older class 
as well. The propensity for repetition in subsequent grades is nevertheless also higher in 
the older classes, so that the in- and outflow of students into the classes largely cancel 
out each other and class size is hence largely unaffected by repetition.  
 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
For the purpose of this analysis, I use standardized test scores in mathematics of 
primary school students in public schools in Minas Gerais. Educational standards in 
Minas Gerais are among the highest for the Brazilian states.
40
 The primary source of 
data in this study is of PROEB (the same source of data used in the first chapter), which 
provides maths test scores at the pupil level for all students in 5
th
 grade in the state.
41
 I 
use the data for 2007, as this is the only year that contains detailed information on 
students’ age. The test is carried out at all public schools in the state and test scores are 
standardized to a mean of 500 with a standard deviation of 100. Participation is 
compulsory at school and individual levels, confirmed by a high student participation 
rate (93%). Surveyed pupils also answer a detailed socioeconomic questionnaire, which 
includes information on sex, month and year of birth, racial background and 
information on the socioeconomic background of the family.  
                                                 
39
 This is due to the fact that grade retention is still possible in third grade and due to excessive school 
absenteeism. 
40
 In the nation-wide school evaluation system of SAEB, 2005 mean maths performance of pupils from 
Minas Gerais is clearly above the Brazilian average, ranking first among Brazilian states 
 (http://www.inep.gov.br/salas/download/prova_brasil/Resultados/Saeb_resultados95_05_UF.pdf).  
41
 In this chapter I use the 2007 wave which tested 5
th
 graders, due to the change of the lengths of primary 
school from eight years to nine years. 
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In the following, I restrict the sample to schools with only two classes. This 
ensures that enough variation is available to identify sizeable group effects for students 
around the cut-off point, in particular with respect to variation in distributional features 
of the class composition.
42
 
The data comprises 16,031 students from 363 public primary schools. Table 15 
presents summary statistics for these data. The average age of students on the test day is 
11.27 years, which is about nine months above the normal age for this grade. This age-
grade mismatch is due to a combination of late enrolment and grade repetition. Students 
at these schools are overwhelmingly from deprived socioeconomic family backgrounds 
and 47% of the families of the students at these schools are recipients of Bolsa Família, 
the Brazilian conditional cash transfer programme for poor and very poor families, 
compared with around 25% in the total population.
43
 
 PROEB also includes headmaster and teacher questionnaires. The headmaster 
questionnaire includes questions on individual characteristics of the headmaster, such as 
age, sex and educational background and questions on school characteristics and 
pedagogic strategy at the school. The teacher questionnaire includes questions on 
individual characteristics, as well as statements on the students in class. 
For part of the analysis, I complement the analysis with data from the 2007 
School Census, which comprises detailed information on school characteristics for all 
primary schools in Brazil. The data appendix provides detailed information on the data 
                                                 
42
 The focus on schools with two classes ensures that school administrators cannot establish special 
classes that do not follow the general assignment mechanism. With more than two classes the school 
administration may resort to forming separate classes in which students with specific characteristics are 
grouped, such as grade repeaters, and are separated from the other students in the cohort. As these special 
classes tend to be rather small, measures of age variation are also more susceptible to outliers (Lyle 
2009). 
43
 Families are eligible for Bolsa Família if per capita family income is not above R$ 120 per month 
(‘moderately poor’) (US$ 63 at 1st June 2007) and receive monthly R$ 20 per child under the condition of 
regular school attendance and participation in vaccination campaigns. Families below a per capita income 
R$ 60 (‘extremely poor’) receive an additional basic family allowance of R$ 62. See 
http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/ and Lindert et al. (2007) for details. 
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sources and the variables used. Summary statistics from the census for the schools used 
in this analysis are presented in Table 22. 
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
The identification strategy used in this chapter exploits the discontinuity in the 
assignment rule of students in schools with two classes. The treatment assignment 
mechanism is based on the value of an observed and continuous variable, the age rank 
(n) of the individual student in each school, in such a way that the probability of 
receiving treatment is a discontinuous function of that variable at the class size cap N , 
the size of the younger class.  
Consider a simple reduced-form model of school achievement f 
              ( )                            (3) 
where Yis denotes the outcome variable maths test score for individual i in school 
s, and Ti is the treatment indicator that takes a value of 0 for individuals in the younger 
class and 1 for individuals in the older class, i  is an individual unobserved error 
component, I ignore at this stage any covariates one might want to include in the 
specification to reduce sampling variability in the estimator. Educational achievement 
measured in terms of test scores is assumed to depend on a smooth function ( )f   of the 
student’s age rank, and on being in either the younger or older class indicated by Ti. I 
employ two-stage least squares to estimate 1 , the coefficient of interest, using the 
discontinuity at the class cap as an instrument for treatment Ti (being in the older class). 
In a first stage-equation, I assume that Ti is a function of age rank of students in 
the school cohort and a dummy Dis for being above or below the school-specific 
discontinuity point N  given by the maximum class size rule: 
1 2 ( )i is iT D f n                           (4) 
65 
 
where i  is an error component.  
For identification of the class effect 1δ , a continuity assumption needs to be 
satisfied, such that student achievement varies continuously with the forcing variable of 
the age rank in the cohort, outside of its influence through treatment Ti (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010), so that assignment to either side of the discontinuity threshold is as 
good as random. In other terms, identification of the treatment effect relies on the 
assumption that just below and above the known cut-off point individuals are similar in 
observable and unobservable characteristics, other than being in different classes. In this 
way, the proposed RD strategy allows me to circumvent confounding effects induced by 
non-random sorting of individuals across groups that plagues the literature on spillover 
effects.  
 
2.5 Empirical results 
Before presenting the regression analysis, it is useful to show the raw data. The upper 
graph of Figure 3 plots standardized local averages of the class rank (1 or 2, to denote 
respectively group 1 or 2) in one month bins, where the age rank has been centred on 
the cut-off point of zero. Local linear regression fits using a rectangular kernel with a 
bandwidth of 3 months are superimposed. The discontinuity in the average class rank at 
the cut-off point is evident and the size of the discontinuity in the probability of 
treatment conditional on the age rank is around 0.5. The estimated increase in the rank 
is less than one, as not all schools choose to allocate students into homogenous classes. 
It appears that smaller schools deviate from this rule, but other than this, I find little 
systematic association between the probability of using the age-ranking rule and 
observable school and pupils characteristics.
44
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 In the Appendix I estimate a linear probability model, where the dependent variable is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 if student assignment is based on the age ranking and zero otherwise. I use the rich 
information in the two datasets on school, headmaster, teacher and students’ characteristics to learn about 
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In panel B of Figure 3, I plot local averages of maths test scores and the local 
linear regression lines on both sides of the cut-off point. The data show a very clear fall 
in maths test scores: the oldest pupil in the younger class shows an average attainment 
in maths that is 0.2 of a standard deviation higher than that of the younger pupil in the 
older class. Hence, Figure 3 suggests that being assigned to the older class significantly 
harms learning outcomes. 
Table 14 presents the first-stage estimates for the size of the discontinuity in mean 
class rank, the OLS estimates for the size of the discontinuity in test scores at the 
discontinuity point and the 2SLS estimates for the causal effect of crossing the cut-off 
point from the younger class to the older class. All specifications include school-fixed 
effects that account for observed and unobserved differences across schools which are 
common across classes. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and adjusted 
for clustering at the school level. Column (1) presents the estimates for the models 
including only a quadratic polynomial in age rank. Column (2) includes controls for the 
whole set of predetermined individual and family characteristics. The estimates of 
column (3) include teacher characteristics in addition to the other covariates.  
The top panel of Table 16 presents estimates for the first stage regressions, where 
the dependent variable is 1 for students being in the older class and zero otherwise. The 
                                                                                                                                               
the determinants of the allocation rule. Specifically I estimate the following linear model: 
0 1 2 3 4Y S D T P u          , where Y takes a value of 1 for an allocation rule that sorts students into 
homogenous age classes and a value of 0 otherwise. S denotes school characteristics, D headmaster 
characteristics, T teacher characteristics, P mean characteristics of pupils in the cohort and u an 
idiosyncratic error term. Table A2 reports the coefficients from the estimated model. Only few variables 
show a statistically significant effect at conventional levels of significance: cohort size, the existence of a 
headmaster’s office, and the headmaster being of an Asian or Indigenous background and the mean 
number of fridges in student’s families. With a larger cohort size, administrators are inclined to choose 
homogenous age sorting. The socioeconomic composition of students in the cohort and mean teacher 
characteristics do not seem to play a role in the choice of the assignment rule of students to classes. Other 
coefficients, such as the existence of a copy machine, the headmaster being of Indigenous background, 
the proportion of Asian students and the mean number of fridges in the student households are only 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In sum, there is little evidence of a systematic choice of the 
allocation rule based on headmaster, teacher or student characteristics. 
. 
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estimates for the size of the discontinuity range between 0.451 and 0.467, similar to the 
observed discontinuity in panel A of Figure 3.  
The middle panel of Table 16 reports the reduced form estimates from an OLS 
regression with maths test scores as the dependent variable on a dummy equal to 1 for 
being to the right of the threshold. Column 1 reports the raw estimate of the 
discontinuity of maths test scores at the cut-off point.  
The bottom panel of Table 16 reports the two-stage-least squares estimates for the 
class peer effects using the same specifications as for the OLS estimates in panels A and 
B. The size of the class peer effect, without further controls, is around 0.57 of a standard 
deviation in maths test scores and significant at the 1% level.  
Under the identifying assumptions outlined in the previous section, the results can 
be interpreted as the causal effect on individuals whose treatment status changes, i.e. 
who were to switch from the younger class to the older class as the value of n changes 
from just below N  to just above N .  
To acquire some understanding of the distribution of effects across schools, I 
estimate school-specific discontinuities in maths test scores. As differences of mean 
peer variables between classes differ across schools, treatment also differs in respect of 
the composition of the peer class environment. Figure 4 plots the kernel density 
estimates of the school-specific discontinuities and shows the relatively symmetric 
distribution of effects around a peak of about -50. I will return to heterogeneous effects 
across schools in Section 7. 
Table 17 presents the RD estimates for wider intervals of the discontinuity sample 
around the cut-off point and different orders of the polynomial terms included in the 
regressions as a first robustness check. Rows 1 and 2 are the estimates of the RD 
without any further controls, rows 3 and 4 are the estimates including the full set of 
controls including individual, family and teacher characteristics. The estimates do not 
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reveal any substantial sensitivity with respect to the choice of the order of the 
polynomial. Replacing the quadratic by a cubic term leaves the estimates virtually 
unchanged. Increasing the range of observations used for the estimation also does not 
alter the estimates for the treatment effect in any significant way. 
 
2.6 Tests for non-random sorting 
As already outlined, there are obvious threats to the identification assumption. Public 
knowledge of the allocation mechanism and the alleged penalty associated with 
treatment may invalidate the continuity assumption required for consistency of the RD 
estimator if the forcing variable is subject to manipulation by optimizing agents 
(McCrary 2008). In the present context, there is potential for manipulation of the 
forcing variable by two sets of agents involved, the parents of the school children and 
school administrators. If either parents or school administrators are able to manipulate 
the assignment of a student precisely around the cut-off point, the ‘as good as random’ 
assignment may fail.
45
  
 In the parents’ case, a threat to the identification strategy arises from parents 
exerting pressure on school administrators to assign their child to the younger class at 
the time of initial enrolment or at a later stage. For the case of students close to the cut-
off point, if the ability of parents to exert pressure and move their child to the younger 
class is systematically related to other unobserved determinants of maths achievement 
(e.g. the home learning environment or the support the student receives) this may 
invalidate the assumptions of the RD design.  
Similarly, the school administration might manipulate class size so to move the 
youngest student in the older class to the younger class, or vice versa, based on some 
                                                 
45
 McCrary (2008) suggests a test for the failure of the random assignment assumption by inspecting for a 
discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable around the discontinuity point. As the forcing variable 
in the present case is uniformly distributed due to its nature as a relative rank, this test will not be 
informative in this analysis. 
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characteristics that are not necessarily observable to the econometrician and that are 
correlated with outcomes. In this case, the cut-off point would simply be shifted by one 
rank upwards/downwards. In reality this is unlikely to happen, as the allocation of 
students is decided before classes start at first grade, so that the school administration 
has no information on ability, race or socioeconomic background of the student other 
than administrative information such as age or sex that is to be found in the documents 
necessary for enrolment, such as a birth certificate.  
In all cases, if manipulation occurred, whether due to schools or parents' pressure, 
pre-determined characteristics of students and their families would presumably no 
longer be balanced on either side of the discontinuity (van der Klaauw 2002). 
In the following I use a very rich array of information from the student 
questionnaire to formally test for the balancing properties of pre-determined student 
characteristics across the cut-off point. Figure 8 provides a graphical analysis of the 
balancing properties of baseline covariates by plotting local averages for the covariates 
and local linear regression fits separately on both sides of the threshold. In Figure 8 
(part 1), the graphs in columns 1 and 3 plot the individual level probability of being a 
girl and the probability of self-identifying with different ethnic groups. The fraction of 
girls reduces smoothly with the age rank. The fraction white, Asian or indigenous 
students in the class does not reveal any discontinuity at the threshold, while the fraction 
of mixed and black students show a minor positive increase at the cut-off point. The 
average number of months repeated before also does not reveal a discontinuity, but 
different slopes of the local linear regression fits are apparent, these being induced by 
the different distribution of repeaters in the two classes. Columns 1 and 3 of Figure 8 
(continued) present the same graphs for a wide range of predetermined socioeconomic 
characteristics. These variables appear well balanced on both sides of the cut-off point 
and there is no indication of a discontinuity in the means of these characteristics at the 
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cut-off point. Among two additional proxies for the socioeconomic status of the family, 
the number of domestic workers employed and the fraction of families receiving Bolsa 
Família, only the latter shows a small difference around the threshold. 
In a formal analysis, I estimate all predetermined characteristics of students using 
the same specification as for the main estimates in Table 16. Table 18 reports the RD 
estimates for these variables. Only the estimate for the probability of being a black 
student is significant at the 5% level.
46
 None of the other household socioeconomic 
characteristics reveal a statistically significant difference at the threshold and most 
coefficients are small, confirming that the balancing properties of these predetermined 
characteristics are satisfied. Although the absence of discontinuities in predetermined 
individual and family characteristics cannot prove the balancing property of 
unobservables, it is reassuring to find that individuals on both sides of the cut-off are 
observationally equivalent.  
The inclusion of these additional individual and family controls in column 2 of 
Table 16 changes only modestly the estimates of the reduced-form regressions. The IV 
estimates at the bottom of the Table are around 20% smaller than without these controls. 
The moderate reduction could likely be explained by model misspecification due to the 
inclusion of the set of predetermined variables. (Imbens and Lemieux 2007).  
 
2.7 Interpretation of the effects 
A crucial question pertains to the channels through which the negative group effect 
operates. The substantial negative effect could either be driven by direct peer effects, 
e.g. through being with on average lower-performing classmates in the older class, or by 
                                                 
46
 Choosing different specifications for the RD by including either only a linear polynomial term or a 
cubic term makes the estimate for this variable insignificant, so that the single significant estimate can 
either be attributed to model misspecification or random chance. Any other specification for the 
functional form or estimating the RD without robust standard errors does not change the significance of 
the estimates of any of the variables. 
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indirect effects of the peer group composition that work through behavioural changes by 
students, teachers or schools to the class composition.  
 
2.7.1 Exogenous peer characteristics and direct peer effects 
In the literature, it is often assumed that peer characteristics such as sex, race and 
socioeconomic status are proxies for (unobserved) peer ability and that exogenous peer 
effects work through being grouped with peers of different ability. The academic 
achievement of marginal students might be affected because there are more or less 
bright students from whom to learn or more or less students who ask stimulating 
questions in class.  
Column 2 of Table 18 reports the estimates of the difference in mean values of a 
number of peer variables for students around the cut-off point. The first row reports the 
difference in peer age in the classrooms and the second row the difference in mean 
months repeated by students in the class. Unlike with the individual characteristics, I 
observe large and significant changes in peers’ characteristics at the threshold. Peers in 
the older class are on average about 8 months older, which is almost completely due to 
the higher share of repeaters in these classes.
47
 The remainder is due to late enrolment at 
first grade and temporary drop-out from school followed by re-enrolment later. 
Repeaters and students who enrol late at first grade often belong to families from 
a more deprived socioeconomic background (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1996 and 
Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994), which causes the socioeconomic indicators of peers 
to be systematically different between the two classes. RD estimates for many of these 
pre-determined characteristics show a statistically significant discontinuity in peer 
characteristics among students around the cut-off point.  
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 Calculation based on the theoretical enrolment age of students and the number of months repeated by 
students show that repetition accounts for about 75% of total age-grade mismatch. 
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Besides mean age, age dispersion in the class also differs considerably between 
the two classes. With the larger number of repeaters, age dispersion in the older classes 
is considerably greater than in the younger classes. The standard deviation of age is 
40% greater (3.5 months) in the older classes (Table 19, row 1). Figures 4 and 5 show 
the distribution of age of students for the two classes and give a graphical representation 
of the difference in the distribution of age between the classes.  
Overall, students to the right of the cut-off point, while not being different from 
students just to the left on a whole range of individual and parental characteristics, have 
peer groups that not only consist of fewer girls, a higher fraction of blacks, a lower 
fraction of mixed students, and a higher share of children from more deprived 
socioeconomic background but also, due to widespread grade repetition, more 
heterogeneous classmates.  
 
2.7.2 Indirect effects: responses of schools 
Another concern for the estimation of class peer effects is, that correlated effects in the 
form of common shocks to the peer group (whether exogenous or endogenous) may bias 
the peer effect estimates. Although it is not possible to completely rule out the existence 
of any differences in the learning environments between the younger and older classes, I 
can nonetheless assess whether there exist observable differences in a broad set of 
teacher and class characteristics, potentially in response to differences in the class 
composition. 
Systematically different learning environments may arise from assigning teachers 
of different quality to either of the two classes. This may happen in a compensatory 
fashion, such that better teachers are allocated to weaker classes, which would lead to an 
underestimation of the peer effect. Better educated or more experienced teachers could 
also be allocated to the younger class to strengthen good students further, which would 
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lead to overestimating the peer effect. Headmasters are asked in the background 
questionnaire how they generally allocate teachers to classes. The vast majority (68%) 
of headmasters report allocating teachers in a non-systematic fashion to classes, either 
by means of a draw or by no specific criteria. Less than 2% of headmasters allocate 
more experienced teachers to stronger classes, and around 16% allocate the more 
experienced teachers to weaker classes. The remainder (13%) allows teachers to select 
the classes among themselves.
48
 
To test whether there still are any systematic differences in teacher characteristics 
between the younger and older classes, I estimate teacher characteristics for the RD 
sample of students using the same specification as for the main estimates and the results 
are reported in Table 19. None of the teacher’s characteristics, including sex, age, race, 
experience, education, training and earnings, reveal any significant difference between 
the two classes and the estimated coefficients are generally very small. This confirms 
that there is no evidence for strategic allocation of teachers. Including teacher 
characteristics as controls in the RD estimates (Table 16, column 3) also does not 
change the estimate for the peer effect in any relevant way.  
Additional information from the teacher questionnaire about the allocation of 
teaching resources within the school to classes also provides some additional evidence 
that the estimates are not biased by common effects. Teachers report on the frequency 
of parent-teacher conferences, the quality of textbooks, and whether the provision of 
financial and pedagogic resources or of teaching support staff for class teaching is 
insufficient. None of the variables on teacher characteristics or teaching resources in the 
classroom reported in Table 19 are significantly different between the two groups. 
                                                 
48
 Unlike in settings in which teacher wages are a function of test scores, teacher wages and promotion in 
public schools in Minas Gerais state are mostly determined by qualification and seniority so that there is 
less of an economic incentive to teach better classes. Details can be found in law No. 15.293 Establishing 
the Careers of Professionals in Basic Education in the state of Minas Gerais. 
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As outlined above, there is some concern about the difference in class size 
between the older and younger classes. The estimate in Table 19 reveals that the number 
of students in the older class is on average lower (by the order of four students) 
compared to the younger class. As class size may have an effect on student 
achievement, this may potentially lead to a bias in the estimation of the peer group 
effect. There is some agreement in the literature that smaller classes may be beneficial 
(see Angrist and Lavy 1999 and Urquiola 2006). The effects reported in the literature 
are nevertheless relatively small and mostly refer to a substantial reduction in the 
number of students per class. In the present case, the older class is on average smaller, 
so that - if anything - this may lead to a downward bias of the true peer group effect on 
student outcomes. As the difference in class size is rather limited, it is unlikely that it 
leads to any considerable bias of the estimates.  
 
2.7.3 Indirect effects: responses of teachers and students 
Despite the fact that teachers are observationally equivalent across classes, their 
teaching practices may differ as a consequence of teaching classes with a different 
composition of students. I use information from the student questionnaire in which 
students report on items related to teaching practices and the behaviour of their peer 
students in class. The item responses that express levels of agreement with different 
statements on peer and teacher behaviour, ranging from 0 to 1, have been aggregated by 
averaging across all the standardized outcomes at the class level.
49
 Table 20 reports the 
RD estimates using the aggregated variables and the specifications as for the estimates 
in Table 19. 
                                                 
49
 Because of missing values in item responses in this part of the student questionnaire, the RD estimates 
on individual values are less precise. As the response of teachers is not limited to the pivotal students at 
the threshold, but should equally affect the other students, using the aggregated data also seems sensible, 
despite the potential for compositional effects. Because the coefficients from the RD on individual data 
are very similar to the estimates in Table 18, compositional effects nonetheless do not seem to play a 
relevant role in this case.  
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The estimates reveal that students report significantly different teaching practices 
across classes. This is particularly remarkable as there are no differences in observable 
teacher characteristics.  
Students in the older class report less often that their teacher is available to clarify 
doubts about the course content. The coefficient is -0.04 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.
50
 Similarly, students in the older class feel that the opportunity to express 
their opinion in class is substantially lower (-0.029, which is about 0.3 of a standard 
deviation of the mean). Further evidence of an effect on teaching practices through the 
impact on the distribution of instruction time is given by the difference in the answers 
on whether the class teacher helps some students more than others. The estimate for this 
variable shows a 0.084 difference between classes. Teachers in the older class are 
compelled to distribute their attention and instructional time more unequally, possibly 
devoting relatively more time to specific groups of students or addressing the same 
material targeted at different skills levels. With a more heterogeneous group, teachers 
may be less able to teach to the median students, as they need to specifically address the 
needs of students at the tails of the distribution. The distributional features of the class 
composition also result in teachers being less able to devote enough time until every 
student has comprehended the material (-0.027).  
The higher dispersion in age and ability presumably demands that teachers 
address different skill levels separately. In support of this hypothesis, the proportion of 
the planned curriculum actually taught during the school year as reported by the teacher 
is about 6% lower for the older classes (Table 20). 
In addition to the above findings on the differences in teaching practices, 
information from the student questionnaire also reveals significant differences in the 
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 Given the categorical nature of the answers to these questions, interpretation is not straightforward. To 
give an idea about the size of the effect, the point estimate is 0.49 of a standard deviation of the mean of 
the variable. 
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behaviour of students. Students in older classes report more often that their classmates 
are noisy and disruptive (0.038).
51
 With a more heterogeneous student composition 
teachers may need to spend more time on particular groups of students and more idle 
time for the remainder of students may also result in more disruptive behaviour.
52
  
The probability of students leaving class early is also substantially higher in the 
older classes (0.070), which may also contribute to disruption of teaching in these 
classes. The less favourable teaching environment is also confirmed by students in the 
older class reporting more often that their teacher needs to wait to start teaching at the 
beginning of class due to noise (0.053).  
The less favourable teaching environment may also have an effect on teacher 
motivation. Students of the older class report more often (0.041) that a teacher has been 
absent from school. The effect on absence of teachers may be interpreted as a response 
to the more deprived and demanding teaching environment. In turn, although difficult to 
quantify in terms of hours of instruction lost, teacher absence may also impact on the 
achievement of students, creating negative feedback effects between class composition, 
teacher and student behaviour. 
Similarly to the findings of Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2012) the above 
results suggest that teaching practices respond to the group composition and may be an 
important channel in explaining the negative peer effect for students close to the class 
threshold.  
Table 19 also shows that the percentage of students who do not participate in the 
PROEB test, due to illness or other reasons, differs between the two classes. Although 
the non-response rate differs between younger and older classes for the peer group and 
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 The difference in class behaviour reported by students is confirmed by information from the teacher 
questionnaire. Teachers in the older classes are more likely to report disciplinary problems with their 
students (0.25) (Table 17). 
52
 Interestingly, students from the entire age rank in the older class, not only marginal students close to 
the threshold, report a higher level of noise and disruption, which suggests that behavioural changes are 
not only due to the higher share of repeaters.  
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is about 9% higher in the older classes, the non-response rate has a smooth transition 
across the discontinuity point. The size of the RD estimate for the non-participation rate 
at the threshold is very small and not statistically significant, so that the estimates 
cannot be confounded by differential non-response rate of students on either side of the 
cut-off point.
53
 
 
2.7.4 Opening the black-box of the peer-group effect: heterogeneous treatment 
across schools 
The previous sections have discussed different potential channels through which the 
peer composition in this setting may lead to the drop in academic performance of 
students close to the cut-off point. It remains a challenging task to distinguish the 
precise role of the different characteristics of peers that lead to such a large 
disadvantage among students in older classes, whether directly or indirectly through 
behavioural adjustments. 
The unique setup at hand with discontinuities in more than 350 schools allows – 
under some assumptions – the examination of the role of different observable 
characteristics of the peer group in explaining the gap in academic achievement. More 
precisely, the fact that the difference in the characteristics of peers between children in 
younger and older classes differs across schools can be used to gain an understanding of 
the role of the different channels. For students around the cut-off point, class 
characteristics, such as the socioeconomic composition of their peer group, are arguably 
quasi-random and the difference of these characteristics between classes varies across 
schools and can be related to the size of the test score difference across classes at the 
threshold. 
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 The data appendix provides information on how the non-response rate on the class level and around the 
threshold has been established. 
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I use a two-stage minimum-distance estimator that can be easily implemented 
using standard statistical packages.
54
 In the first stage I estimate the size of the 
discontinuity in test scores at the cut-off and the differences in peer characteristics 
between the two classes by 2SLS separately for each school. In the second stage, the 
estimated discontinuities in test scores are used as dependent variable and are regressed 
on the estimated differences in class characteristics zcs 
                                   (5) 
where bs are the estimated discontinuities in test scores for marginal students from the 
first stage.  
Because the estimates of bs are based on regressions using individual data, the 
minimum distance estimator is derived by minimizing the weighted difference between 
the auxiliary parameters from the first stage estimation, where the weights are equal to 
the reciprocal of the square of the standard errors of the first stage running minimum-
distance weighted least squares. Given the quasi-random allocation of students close to 
the threshold, the set of class characteristics are exogenous for the marginal students at 
each school, so that the variation in these differences across schools can be related 
causally to the size of the discontinuity in test scores. Under the assumption of 
homogenous treatment effects, by instrumenting all class characteristics by the 
probability of being on either side of the cut-off point, this procedure should deliver 
estimates of the effect of the class characteristics that are purged of the bias induced by 
non-random sorting of pupils across classes by a minimum-distance RD design. 
Obviously, to the extent that there are other unobservable class level 
characteristics that affect outcomes and are correlated with the included regressors, the 
minimum distance estimates will still confound the effect of such variables with the 
effect of the included regressors. For example, if being older is also associated with 
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 Wolfowitz (1957) introduced the minimum-distance estimator. See Kodde et al. (1990) for details. 
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lower innate ability, for example because older students have previously repeated a 
grade, but I am unable to measure ability, the measure of the average age of peers will 
also pick up the effect of having less able peers. It is consequently not possible to 
disentangle the effect of ability heterogeneity from the effect of age heterogeneity in 
this context. 
Table 21 reports the coefficients of the above two-stage procedure.
55
 Most of the 
independent class characteristics are very imprecisely estimated and the direction of the 
effect is puzzling for some variables. The estimate of the difference in absolute age 
between the two classes on the test score gap is small and not statistically significant. 
Also, the coefficient for the difference in mean grades repeated by students in each class 
is small and not significant. Although a considerable part of the differences in the mean 
and the variation of age is due to the different fraction of repeaters in the two classes, 
this does not seem to drive the negative effect estimated earlier. I even find a small 
negative effect on the absolute magnitude of the estimated discontinuity in test scores, 
but the estimate is not statistically significant. 
Other coefficients reveal a relatively unsystematic pattern: some of the differences 
in class characteristics are positively related to the size of the discontinuity, such as the 
fraction of male students, the fraction of black students, or the mean number of 
computers available at the homes of students, while other variables show a negative 
relationship, such as the fraction of white and mixed students or mean books in the 
students’ households. None of these estimates is nevertheless statistically significant at 
conventional levels of significance. The coefficients for the mean number of washing 
machines and freezers are marginally significant at the 10% level of significance. 
Despite the pronounced differences in various socioeconomic peer characteristics, these 
do not seem to play a significant role in explaining the estimated group effect. The 
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 The dependent variable of the test score gap carries a positive sign, so that a larger positive value refers 
to a larger negative discontinuity in math test scores between class 1 and 2. 
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single significant variable for explaining heterogeneity in the size of the discontinuities 
across schools is the difference in the age dispersion between classes. A one month 
difference in the standard deviation of age explains 0.035 of a standard deviation in 
maths test scores.  
These findings are in line with the results of Hoxby and Weingarth’s (2006) on 
the importance of the age dispersion in the reference group on academic achievement. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter I introduce a novel way of identifying class peer effects using an RD 
design that exploits the rule which assigns students of a cohort to classes according to 
their ranking along the age distribution. The RD design allows us to compare students 
who are very similar in age but occur to be assigned to classes with either younger or 
older students. By exploiting this rule I provide evidence for strong negative effects on 
maths achievement for marginal students of being in a class with older peers. I find that 
marginal students who are assigned to the older classes have maths test scores that are 
around half of a standard deviation lower than those of students assigned to the younger 
classes.  
Concurrently with being in different peer environments, marginal students are 
also either the oldest or the youngest in their respective classes and, apart from the 
effect from being assigned to classes with different peer characteristics and their 
distribution, there could be a separate pure relative age effect at work. It is nevertheless 
debatable whether conceptually there is a difference between a potential pure relative 
age effect and an age peer group effect and, given the identification strategy, these 
effects would by definition be practically indistinguishable. Moreover, there is no 
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evidence for the existence of a separate pure relative age effect elsewhere in the 
literature.
56
  
The results contribute to the debate on streaming or tracking of students into 
classes and schools and have direct policy implications. If the distribution of underlying 
observable student characteristics in classes has substantial effects on achievement, 
while changes in the composition could possibly be achieved at zero cost at the school 
level, there is a strong case for sorting students into classes aiming at a more 
homogenous class composition in terms of age or ability. Findings in the related 
literature point to a potential trade-off between direct and indirect peer effects from 
grouping students by age or ability. Zimmer (2003) finds that tracking in the US has a 
positive effect even on low-achieving students through more tailored instruction and can 
outweigh the negative direct effect on low-achievers from the absence in high quality 
peers. When grouping students according to ability, low-achieving students may no 
longer benefit from the presence of high-achieving peers, but instead may take 
advantage of the lower variation in ability, potentially leading to a more efficient 
teaching environment for all students. It is particularly important to consider this trade-
off in educational systems with substantial age and ability heterogeneity, as is the case 
in many low- and middle-income countries.  
The findings in this chapter also contribute to the understanding of policies that 
aim at reducing the age variation in cohorts of students. Policies designed to reduce late 
enrolment in primary schools may have positive effects on all students by reducing the 
age heterogeneity in each cohort. Correspondingly, grade retention policies may have a 
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 Using experimental data from Project STAR, Cascio and Whitmore Schanzenbach (2007) do not find 
evidence for an effect from relative age on mean test scores. Elder and Lubotsky (2009) also show that a 
commonly postulated positive relationship between achievement and school entry age is primarily driven 
by the skills older children acquired prior to kindergarten rather than absolute or relative age effects. As 
the identification strategy employed in this chapter is based on the discontinuity around the median age in 
the cohort, the estimated effects are not confounded by relative age effects at the extremes of the age 
distribution, i.e. being the youngest or oldest in the cohort, so that targeting the curriculum to a specific 
age group will not bias the estimated effects. 
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significant impact on the dispersion of age in cohorts of students and may therefore 
affect achievement of all students. Retained students increase the dispersion of age in 
the cohort and may impose a negative externality on all students in the class regardless 
of the existence of direct and indirect effects of having (low-achieving) repeaters in the 
peer group.  
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Table 15: Means and Proportions of Student and Teacher Characteristics 
Panel A: Student characteristics                                        Younger class        Older class 
 Class size  24.738 (0.287)  21.868 (0.302) 
Age (in years)   10.930 (0.009)  11.670 (0.014) 
Sex Female 0.524 (0.005) 0.458 (0.006) 
Race White 0.306 (0.005) 0.264 (0.005) 
 Mixed 0.526 (0.005) 0.517 (0.006) 
 Black 0.097 (0.003) 0.143 (0.004) 
 East-Asian 0.027 (0.002) 0.034 (0.002) 
 Indigenous 0.044 (0.002) 0.042 (0.002) 
Repeater  Never repeated 0.797 (0.004) 0.489 (0.006) 
 Repeated once 0.142 (0.004) 0.292 (0.005) 
 Repeated twice 0.043 (0.002) 0.148 (0.004) 
 Repeated 3 or more times 0.018 (0.001) 0.070 (0.003) 
SES Family with Bolsa Família 0.480 (0.005) 0.592 (0.006) 
 Household employs domestic worker 0.137 (0.004) 0.113 (0.004) 
 Number of books  23.496 (0.322)  19.428 (0.330) 
 Number of cars 0.608 (0.009) 0.503 (0.009) 
 Number of computers 0.262 (0.005) 0.195 (0.005) 
 Number of fridges 0.999 (0.005) 0.958 (0.006) 
 Number of freezers 0.302 (0.006) 0.282 (0.007) 
 Number of radios 1.342 (0.008) 1.286 (0.009) 
 Number of TVs 1.497 (0.008) 1.396 (0.009) 
 Number of DVD players 0.849 (0.007) 0.786 (0.008) 
 Number of bathrooms 1.246 (0.006) 1.175 (0.006) 
 Number of washing machines 0.758 (0.007) 0.752 (0.007) 
 Number of tumble dryers 0.168 (0.005) 0.163 (0.005) 
Panel B: Teacher characteristics     
Sex Female 0.983 (0.011) 0.965 (0.015) 
Age (in years)  40.495 (0.468)  40.094 (0.486) 
Race White 0.456 (0.030) 0.477 (0.030) 
 Mixed 0.420 (0.029) 0.399 (0.029) 
 Black 0.093 (0.017) 0.081 (0.016) 
 East-Asian 0.028     (0.010) 0.039 (0.012) 
 Indigenous 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
Highest  Secondary education 0.100 (0.018) 0.118 (0.019) 
edu. degree Higher education – pedagogic degree 0.210 (0.024) 0.208 (0.024) 
 Higher education - regular 0.410 (0.029) 0.389 (0.029) 
 
Higher education and teaching 
qualification 0.203 (0.024) 0.174 (0.022) 
 Higher education – other 0.076 (0.016) 0.111 (0.019) 
 Earnings (in R$)  771.74 (22.803)  743.60 (23.754) 
 Years of experience in education  14.023 (0.360)  13.862 (0.375) 
 Participation in continuing education 0.375 (0.028) 0.363 (0.029) 
Notes: The data from the upper panel are taken from the student background questionnaires, the data from the 
lower panel are from the teacher questionnaires. Source: PROEB 2007.  
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Table 16: Main Estimation Results 
   (1) (2) (3) 
    
 
  
   Panel A: first stage 
   Dependent variable: class rank 
   0.467*** 0.453*** 0.451*** 
   (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
  R
2
 0.326 0.370 0.403 
    
 
  
   Panel B: reduced form 
   Dependent variable: maths test scores 
   -26.445*** -19.196** -19.513** 
   (7.458) (7.646) (7.743) 
  R
2
 0.405 0.482 0.485 
    
 
  
   Panel C: IV regression discontinuity results 
   Dependent variable: maths test scores 
   -56.574*** -42.385*** -43.297*** 
   (15.299) (15.455) (15.673) 
  R
2
          0.410 0.485 0.489 
Observations:               1,688                1,688             1,688 
School fixed effects  yes   yes  yes 
Individual controls  no yes      yes 
Teacher controls  no no yes 
Notes: The top panel reports the first stage regressions using OLS estimating equation (4). The middle 
panel reports the coefficient on maths test score on the dummy equal 1 for the age rank larger then 0 
(reduced form). Test scores are centred using school fixed effects in all specifications. The bottom panel 
reports IV estimates of the effect of being in the older class on maths test scores, where being in the older 
class has been instrumented by a dummy for having an age rank larger than 0. All specifications include a 
second-order polynomial in the age rank. Specifications in column (2) include the whole set of 
predetermined individual and family characteristics, including sex, race, repeated years and SES family 
characteristics; specifications in column (3) additionally include all predetermined teacher characteristics, 
including teacher sex, race, age, salary, variables on educational background and experience. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are clustered by schools and reported in parenthesis. ** and 
*** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 17: RD Estimates of Maths Test Scores 
 Ranks from threshold in months 
 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 
 Estimated discontinuity at threshold 
Quadratic -56.574*** -54.578*** -59.044*** -57.193*** -59.182*** 
 (15.299) (12.561) (11.103) (10.791) (10.653) 
Cubic -55.477*** -54.467*** -59.560*** -57.188*** -58.416*** 
 (15.551) (12.622) (11.106) (10.842) (10.722) 
Quadratic with full controls -43.297*** -43.762*** -45.216*** -43.600*** -43.066*** 
 (15.673) (12.446) (11.259) (10.980) (10.675) 
Cubic with full controls -41.689** -43.753*** -45.625*** -43.769*** -42.726*** 
 (16.299) (12.45) (11.274) (11.031) (10.749) 
Number of student observations 1,688 3,142 4,547 5,884 7,223 
Notes: The dependent variable is the maths test score and entries are estimates of the discontinuity including the different 
range of observations in terms of the age rank indicated by the column heading. Entries for row (1) are the estimated 
coefficients of the RD from models that include a quadratic polynomial in the age rank for the different range of 
observations.  Row (2) includes a cubic polynomial in the age rank. Rows (3) and (4) additionally include the full set of 
controls as in column (4) of Table 16. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and *** 
denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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 Table 18: RD Estimates of Predetermined Individual and Family Variables 
   (1)      (2) 
      Individuals       Peers 
 Age (in months)  0.442 (0.735)        8.157 *** (0.796) 
 Grades repeated (in months)  0.728 (0.879)        7.487 *** (0.457) 
Fraction of: Female  0.190 (0.127)       -0.088 *** (0.019) 
 White  0.008 (0.092) -0.035 (0.023) 
 Mixed -0.037 (0.102)     -0.072 ** (0.032) 
 Black      0.115** (0.055)         0.089 *** (0.018) 
 East-Asian -0.026 (0.022)   0.011 (0.009) 
 Indigenous -0.076 (0.047) -0.001 (0.009) 
 Domestic helper -0.020 (0.058)       -0.053 *** (0.017) 
 Bolsa Família    0.165* (0.099)         0.144 *** (0.027) 
 Parental homework support  0.027 (0 .054)        -0.066 *** (0.016) 
Number of: Bathrooms -0.101 (0.098)        -0.129 *** (0.033) 
 Books -4.314 (4.956)        -8.016 *** (1.928) 
 Cars -0.167 (0.138)        -0.141 *** (0.039) 
 Computers -0.031 (0.068)        -0.108 *** (0.022) 
 Fridges  0.096 (0.077)      -0.074 ** (0.031) 
 Freezers -0.013 (0.087)      -0.052 ** (0.025) 
 Radios  0.195 (0.158)  -0.083 (0.052) 
 Washing machines  0.080 (0.105)  -0.037 (0.033) 
 Dryers -0.057 (0.082)   0.014 (0.021) 
 DVDs  0.125 (0.121)        -0.120 *** (0.035) 
 TV sets -0.008 (0.141)        -0.194 *** (0.042) 
 Video players  0.080 (0.107)      -0.066 ** (0.028) 
Number of student observations      1,688         1,688  
Notes: Entries are separate IV estimates of the class effect on student and family characteristics, where being 
in the second class has been instrumented by a dummy for having an age rank larger than 0. For each variable 
a separate regression has been estimated. Column (1) reports the effect around the discontinuity point for the 
individual values of the characteristics; column (2) reports the estimates for the values of the peer group 
characteristics for the same individuals around the cut-off point. All specifications include a second-order 
polynomial in the age rank Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered on the school level are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 19: Class and Teacher Characteristics 
Dependent variable    
Class characteristics Std. deviation of age (in months) 4.012 *** (0.381) 
 Class size -4.162 *** (0.583) 
 Non-participation rate (at threshold) 0.006  (0.004) 
 Non-participation rate (of peers) 0.093 *** (0.022) 
Teacher characteristics Female -0.087 * (0.049) 
 Age (in years) -1.607 (1.615) 
 White -0.005 (0.101) 
 Mixed -0.048 (0.103) 
 Black 0.025 (0.060) 
 East-Asian 0.020 (0.033) 
 Indigenous 0.009 (0.009) 
 Higher education degree 0.030 (0.077) 
 Postgraduate degree -0.034 (0.103) 
 Years passed since graduation -0.108 (0.226) 
 Earnings (in Brazilian Reais) -69.176 (56.943) 
 Participation in continuing education -0.015 (0.091) 
 Experience in education (in years) -0.395 (0.259) 
 Teacher has other source of income -0.089 (0.093) 
Teaching resources Frequency of parent-teacher conferences 0.068 (0.135) 
 Quality of textbooks 0.178 (0.098) 
 Insufficient financial resources -0.024 (0.080) 
 Insufficient pedagogic resources -0.063 (0.108) 
 Insufficient teaching support staff 0.036  (0.102) 
Number of student observations 1,688   
Notes: Entries are separate IV estimates of the class effect on class and teacher characteristics, where 
being in the second class has been instrumented by a dummy for having an age rank larger than 0. For 
each variable a separate regression has been estimated. The data come from the teacher questionnaire of 
PROEB 2007 and the School Census (for class characteristics). Class teacher statements come from the 
teacher questionnaire and relate to the specific class taught. Class size is calculated using the official 
number of students enrolled in a class based on information from the School Census. The non-
participation rate (at threshold) is based on the difference in the distribution of students of age ranks 
between the school census and PROEB test takers. The non-participation rate of peers is based on the 
difference between class size and number of students participating in the PROEB test. The variable 
quality of textbooks ranges between 0 and 1, with the value 1 given for the best quality and 0 for the 
lowest. All regressions control for school fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. * and *** denote significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 20: Response of Teaching Practices to Class Composition 
Disciplinary problems with students 0.253 ** (0.113) 
Rate of planned curriculum taught -0.059 *** (0.019) 
Rate of students expected to finish primary school -0.097 *** (0.023) 
Rate of students expected to finish secondary school -0.133 *** (0.031) 
Teacher availability to clarify doubts -0.039 *** (0.008) 
Teacher explains until all students understand -0.027 *** (0.009) 
Teacher gives opportunity to express oneself -0.029 *** (0.010) 
Teacher helps more some students   0.084 *** (0.015) 
Teacher interested in learning progress -0.028 *** (0.007) 
Teacher needs to wait to start teaching   0.053 *** (0.017) 
Teacher absenteeism   0.041 *** (0.012) 
Fellow students leave classroom early   0.070 *** (0.015) 
Fellow students are noisy and disruptive   0.038 *** (0.015) 
Fellow students learn taught material -0.044 *** (0.010) 
Fellow students pay attention in class -0.009 (0.010) 
Teacher enforces student attention -0.010 (0.007) 
Teacher corrects homework -0.020 (0.013) 
Number of student observations          1,688  
Notes: Entries are separate IV estimates of the class effect on the response of teachers and students 
to the class composition, where being in the older class has been instrumented by a dummy for 
having an age rank larger than 0. For each variable a separate regression has been estimated.  The 
variables in the top panel are from the teacher questionnaire. The variable disciplinary problems 
with students is a dummy taking a value 1 if teachers report that there are problems with the 
discipline of students. The variables from the bottom two panels come from the student 
questionnaire of PROEB 2007. The variables have been recoded from categories ranging from 
“totally disagree” to “totally agree” on a scale from 0-1 and aggregated on the class level. All 
regressions control for school fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered 
on the school level, are reported in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 21: Heterogeneous Treatment across Schools 
Difference in class means    
Age dispersion 3.485 ** (1.446) 
Mean age (in months) -0.704 (1.625) 
Mean grades repeated (in months) -2.149 (23.899) 
Fraction of male students 26.985 (26.070) 
Fraction of white students -21.781 (35.988) 
Fraction of mixed students -35.811 (26.031) 
Fraction of black students 23.887 (50.446) 
Fraction of Asian students -81.925 (106.722) 
Fraction of households with domestic workers -1.419 (49.267) 
Fraction of households receiving Bolsa Família -29.259 (35.020) 
Mean books -30.246 (18.638) 
Mean bathrooms -2.999 (32.698) 
Mean cars 0.302 (25.877) 
Mean computers 4.398 (43.518) 
Mean fridges -16.989 (28.483) 
Mean freezers -58.830 * (33.266) 
Mean radios 31.154 (24.689) 
Mean washing machines 41.407 * (22.327) 
Mean DVD players 42.635 (32.030) 
Mean TV sets -3.199 (24.698) 
Mean video players 34.795 (33.711) 
Teacher controls         yes   
Number of observations (discontinuities):          363   
R
2
        0.302   
Notes: The dependent variables are measures of the absolute size of the discontinuities in math test 
scores at the cut-off point on the school level estimated by 2SLS. The entries report coefficients 
from the second stage of the minimum distance estimation, where the weights are equal to the 
inverse of the standard errors of the estimates of the first stage. Independent variables are the 
estimated differences in means of the peer values of socioeconomic characteristics, class age and 
its distribution. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * and ** 
denote significance at the 10% and 5 level, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Local Averages and Local Linear 
Regression of Treatment and Outcome Variable 
 
Notes: The graphs plot local averages of the standardized class rank of 
students and of the standardized maths test score according to the age 
ranking in the cohort as distance of students from the cut-off point and 
local linear regression fits on both sides of the cut-off point using a 
rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 3 months. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of RD Estimates Across Schools 
 
Notes: The graph plots kernel density estimates of school specific 
estimated discontinuities using a rectangle kernel with a bandwidth of 20. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Age Distribution in the Cohort 
 
Notes: The graph plots the density of student age for all students in the 
cohort, age is reported in months. 
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Figure 6: Age Distribution in Younger Classes 
 
Notes: The graph plots the density of student age for class 1 (younger 
class), age is reported in months. 
  
 
Figure 7: Age Distribution in Older Classes 
 
Notes: The graph plots the density of student age for class 2 (older 
class), age is reported in months. 
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2.9 Data appendix 
This appendix describes the variables of students, teachers, class, headmaster and 
schools used in this chapter. 
 
Outcome variable: Maths test score 
The PROEB test score for mathematics has been constructed from a battery of 40 
multiple choice questions covering four areas: space and shapes, size and measurement, 
algebraic operations, and treatment of information. For each question, students are 
offered 4 possible answers, of which one is correct. The test scores have been 
standardized to a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. The test is administered 
in November, close to the end of the school year. 
 
Student socioeconomic characteristics 
All information on the socioeconomic background of students comes from a 
socioeconomic questionnaire which is a supplement to the maths test. Racial affiliation 
is self-reported by students, as well as all other information on the background 
characteristics of the students and their families.  
The dummy variable Bolsa Família reports whether the family is a recipient of cash-
transfers from the federal programme and takes a value of 1 if the family is a recipient. 
The dummy variable domestic worker records whether the family employs one or more 
domestic workers (part-/full-time). 
The variables on the number of books, cars, computers, fridges, freezers, radios, 
TVs, DVD players, bathrooms, washing machines and tumble dryers are numeric and 
can take the values “0”, “1”, “2” or “3 and more”. The value of “3 and more” has been 
coded with a value of 3. 
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The variable individual age of students has been created based on three 
questions related to age. Students need to provide their age in years, their month of birth 
and indicate whether or not they have already passed their birthday in the current 
calendar year. This information, together with the test date of PROEB, allows the age of 
the children in years and months to be established. The average age of students is 
135.28 months, which is approximately 11.27 years. This is about 9 months above the 
appropriate age at the end of 5
th
 grade. Average age in the younger classes is 131 
months and in the older class 140 months. The standard deviation of age in the cohort at 
5
th
 grade is 12.09 months. The distribution of age in the two classes differs quite 
considerably with a standard deviation of age in the younger classes of 10.02 months 
and of14.16 months in the older classes. Figure 5 plots the density of age in the entire 
cohort and shows how the age distribution is skewed to the right. The histograms of 
Figures 4 and 5 show the different distribution of age in the two classes. Both 
distributions are positively skewed, with the mass of the distribution concentrated to the 
left. This is due because age is censored at the left tail with a minimum enrolment age of 
5½, and the upper age limit. The maximum observed age is 15 years, which is almost 4 
years above the average age and 5½ years above the possible youngest age. The 
substantial age-grade distortion in the student cohort can mostly be attributed to grade 
repetition by students. Every year repeated by a student contributes to the age variation 
based on the distribution of birth dates and the enrolment cut-off point at 1
st
 grade. With 
20% of students having repeated one year, 9% having repeated twice and 4% having 
repeated three or more times, repetition accounts almost wholly for the age-grade 
distortion observed in the data (grade repetition accounts for approximately half a year 
in mean student age). The remainder is likely to be due to some late enrolment and 
school dropout with re-enrolment or change of school by students who are then 
reassigned to a lower grade. Unfortunately, I do not have available information on 
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enrolment age for the cohort of interest. From the School Census 2007 that contains 
information on age for individual students for 1
st
 grade, I can calculate that late 
enrolment is responsible for about 1.8 months, which is likely to be similar to the effect 
of late enrolment in the cohort of consideration that had enrolled 4 years earlier. 
 
Teacher characteristics, statements of teachers on class teaching environment and class 
characteristics 
The information on teacher characteristics comes from two sources and these are 
matched by school and class identifiers and the subject the teachers teach. All 
information on socioeconomic characteristics (in panel B of Table 15) comes from the 
annual Brazilian School Census that collects information on school, teacher and 
headmaster characteristics from all Brazilian schools. The variables years passed since 
graduation and the different variables on teacher professional experience have been 
transformed using midpoints of the ranges reported in the questionnaire. Salary of 
teachers is reported in Brazilian Reais (R$1 was worth approximately US$0.58, as of 
10
th
 September 2010) and is calculated from the mid-points of the salary ranges given in 
the questionnaire.  
The information on the teaching environment and student behaviour comes from 
the background questionnaire of PROEB that is completed by all teachers. Frequency of 
class council meetings is reported as never, once, twice and three times and more, the 
last of which has been recoded with a value of 3, and reports on the adequacy of 
financial and pedagogic resources for class teaching are dummy variables taking a value 
of 1 if teachers think that resources are insufficient and 0 otherwise. Teacher statements 
about the progress of teaching and students have been included from the Prova Brasil 
2007 teacher background questionnaire. The percentages of the planned curriculum 
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taught, and students finishing primary and secondary school, have been calculated using 
the midpoint of the percentage ranges reported by teachers.  
The variable on standard deviation of age in the classes is calculated using 
individual student age. The variable class size is based on information from the official 
School Census that reports the number of students in each class.  
The Non-participation rate at the class level is based on the difference between 
official student numbers as recorded by the School Census and the number of students 
participating in the PROEB test at the class level. The Non-participation rate at the 
threshold is established using information from the school census on the complete age 
distribution of all students at school. The difference between official numbers and 
numbers of students taking the PROEB test for the same age rank (as in monthly 
intervals) at the school level informs about the missing students and the non-response 
rate of students for each age rank at schools.  
 
Student evaluation of teaching practices and classroom environment 
The information about teaching practices and the classroom environment in Table 20 
come from the student background questionnaire of PROEB. The variables report 
means on the class level. The bottom four variables refer directly to classmates of 
students, whereas the top variables refer to teaching practices and teacher behaviour. 
Students report their level of agreement to statements about teaching practices and the 
behaviour of their classmates, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The categories 
have been recoded to range from 0 (strong disagreement) to 1 (strong agreement). Table 
24 reports the mean and standard deviation for these variables on the class level.  
 
 
 
97 
 
School characteristics and headmaster characteristics 
The information on physical school characteristics comes from the annual School 
Census.  
The dummy variable urban school takes a value of 1 for being in an urban setting, and 0 
for a rural setting. 
The dummy variable state school takes a value of 1 for the school being under the 
direct administration of the state secretariat of education in Minas Gerais and 0 for a 
municipal school which is under administration of the municipal secretariat of 
education. 
The variables of headmaster office, faculty room, school library, video facilities, 
TV room, copy machine, printer, overhead projector, school kitchen, internet access, 
computer and science lab, filtered water, public water supply, public sewerage and 
sport facilities are all dummy variables taking a value of 1 when the facilities exist at 
the school and 0 otherwise. 
 
Normalization on school and class level 
As mentioned in the text, each of the regressions includes school fixed effects. For this 
purpose all variables used for the RD analysis have been normalized to have a mean of 
0 at school level. Furthermore, the ranking of students has been centred on a cut-off 
point of 0, reporting the age rank as distance from the cut-off point.  
 
2.10 Appendix on initial class assignment and class transition 
Primary education in Brazil is divided into two stages. The first stage (initial years) 
comprises five years and the second stage (final years) the remaining four years of 
primary education. During the initial years a single class teacher (professor regente) 
teaches the entire curriculum covering all subjects (mathematics, Portuguese, science, 
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history, geography), whereas classes are taught by specialized teachers separately for 
different subjects in the last four years of primary school.
57
 The aim of the initial years, 
besides the achievement of curriculum targets, is to establish social and emotional ties 
and to build the capacity of students in interacting with other children of similar age and 
with adults.
58
 To facilitate this aim, all subjects are taught by a single class teacher and 
students remain in their originally assigned class formed at first grade throughout the 
first five years of primary school. It is therefore informative to learn about the initial 
assignment of students into classes and the transition of students from grade to another. 
As PROEB only focuses on the cohorts tested (5
th
 and 9
th
 grade of primary school) there 
is nevertheless no individual data for the initial class assignment at first grade for the 
cohort of interest. With a change in the data collection method of the Brazilian school 
census in 2007, information on individual students rather than aggregated class and 
school data is collected from the year 2007. The school census contains information on 
individual characteristics on age, sex and the racial attribution of students and permits to 
test whether or not the balancing properties of these predetermined characteristics are 
satisfied for the entry cohort of 2007. Table 25 reports the RD estimates for these 
characteristics for the 2007 entry cohort of first graders. The coefficients of the RD 
estimates for sex or the racial attributes of students at the threshold are relatively small 
and not statistically significant, confirming that the predetermined characteristics are 
balanced across the threshold for first grade students of the entry of cohort of primary 
school.  
Using the 2007 and 2008 census I can follow the cohorts of students from school 
year 2007 to school year 2008.
59
 The transition information includes the records of 
students being promoted from 1
st
 to 2
nd
, from 2
nd
 to 3
rd
, from 3
rd
 to 4
th
 and from 4
th
 to 5
th
 
                                                 
57
 Details are outlined in Resolution SEE No 1086 of the State Secretariat of Education Minas Gerais. 
58
 Brazilian Ministry of Education (2004). 
59
 For this exercise the student information is available only for a restricted sample of schools. Not all 
schools have recorded consistently the student information across years in the school census, so that the 
information on the transition of classes is only available for 55 schools. 
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grade and I have pooled all the cohorts together. Over 80% of students remain in the 
class with the same peers. Conditional on regular transition, 96% of students remain in 
the same peer environment. Regressing the probability of being in class j (j=1/2) at time 
t-1 on the probability of being in group j at time t, conditional on age rank at age t-1 does 
not reveal a significant difference for remaining with the same class for students that 
rank close to the cut-off point, so that students close to the threshold have the same 
(high) probability to stay with the same class the next year compared to students further 
away from the threshold. 
 
2.11 Appendix on selection of schools in the sample 
In this chapter I use schools with two classes in a given cohort only; schools with 
a single class are excluded given the RD identification strategy. I excluded schools with 
more than two classes for two reasons: This precludes to install ‘special’ classes of low 
performing students, students with behavioural problems, or students with other specific 
observable or unobservable characteristics, such as repeaters. As these may be removed 
strategically from the cut-off this could invalidate the assumption of random assignment 
around the class cap. This also ensures that there is sufficient variation in class 
characteristics to estimate meaningful peer effects.  
It may nevertheless be interesting to understand whether students used in this 
paper are different from students in all the other schools. In Table 23 I report the socio-
economic composition of students in schools with 2 classes with students from all other 
schools. Students look very similar in terms of their socio-economic composition. The 
fraction of white and black students in the schools used in this chapter is slightly 
smaller, in exchange for more mixed students. Overall students used in the analysis 
seem to have a slightly better socio-economic status, as evidenced by the smaller 
fraction of student’s receiving Bolsa Família and the larger number of books present in 
100 
 
the household. In the contrary though, students from schools with two classes have on 
average less cars available compared to the students from all other schools; there is 
essentially no difference in the fraction of families employing a domestic worker. 
Overall, the socio-economic composition of students at schools with two classes does 
not differ largely from students at all other schools. 
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Table 22: Means and Proportions of School and Headmaster Characteristics 
Physical school characteristics  
Means Permanent class rooms 10.250 (0.190) 
 Number of total staff 46.110 (1.150) 
 Class size 23.199 (0.217) 
Proportions Urban school 0.910 (0.020) 
 State school 0.553 (0.030) 
 Municipal school 0.447 (0.030) 
 Headmaster office 0.897 (0.016) 
 Faculty room 0.844 (0.019) 
 School library 0.825 (0.020) 
 Video facilities 0.356 (0.010) 
 TV room 0.979 (0.007) 
 Video player 0.902 (0.015) 
 DVD player 0.847 (0.019) 
 Copy machine 0.370 (0.025) 
 Printer 0.903 (0.017) 
 Overhead projector 0.788 (0.023) 
 School kitchen 0.926 (0.013) 
 Internet connectivity 0.589 (0.028) 
 Computer laboratory 0.355 (0.025) 
 Science laboratory 0.106 (0.016) 
 Facilities for disabled children 0.820 (0.020) 
 Filtered water 0.989 (0.005) 
 Public water supply 0.950 (0.011) 
 Public energy supply 0.997 (0.003) 
 Public sewerage 0.828 (0.019) 
 Waste collection 0.913 (0.015) 
 Sport facilities 0.606 (0.027) 
Headmaster characteristics 
Sex Female   0.860 (0.020) 
Race White   0.452 (0.028) 
 Mixed   0.427 (0.028) 
 Black   0.068 (0.014) 
 Asian   0.046 (0.014) 
 Indigenous   0.007 (0.005) 
 Age (in years) 43.100 (0.054) 
Highest educational 
level Secondary education   0.050 (0.123) 
 Higher education – pedagogic degree   0.318 (0.026) 
 Higher education – maths   0.428 (0.028) 
 Higher education – literature   0.053 (0.013) 
 Higher education – other   0.151 (0.020) 
 Earnings (in R$) 
     
1635.49 (38.85) 
 Years of experience in education  18.090 (0.209) 
 Years of experience at this school    6.210 (0.241) 
 Years of experience as headmaster    6.949 (0.258) 
 Participation in continuing education    0.114 (0.020) 
Notes: Data for the physical school characteristics comes from the annual Brazilian School Census, 
headmaster characteristics come from the 2007 wave of PROEB. 
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Table 23: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Students in Schools in 
Sample/ not in Sample 
Schools In sample Not in sample 
 (1) (2) 
Age (in years) 10.789 (0.009) 10.716 (0.002) 
Fraction male 0.492 (0.004) 0.493 (0.001) 
Fraction white 0.286 (0.004) 0.303 (0.001) 
Fraction mixed 0.521 (0.004) 0.497 (0.001) 
Fraction black 0.119 (0.003) 0.123 (0.001) 
Fraction Asian 0.031 (0.001) 0.033 (0.000) 
Fraction Indigeneous 0.043 (0.002) 0.044 (0.000) 
Family with Bolsa Família 0.467 (0.004) 0.498 (0.001) 
Family employs domestic worker 0.127 (0.003) 0.124 (0.001) 
Number of books 22.020 (0.224) 21.415 (0.054) 
Number of cars 0.560 (0.006) 0.619 (0.002) 
Notes: The table reports socio-economic characteristics of students in schools in the sample 
used for the analysis (2 classes in 5
th
 grade) and for students not in the sample (one class, or 
three and more classes in 5
th
 grade. Colum (1) reports mean characteristics of students ion 
schools with two classes per cohort, and column (2) characteristics of students in any other 
school. Data comes from the socio-economic questionnaire of the 2007 wave of PROEB. 
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Table 24: Choice of Class Assignment Rule 
  coefficient s.e. 
SCHOOL PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 Urban school 0.025  (0.121 
 State school 0.006  (0.06 
 Number of permanent class rooms 0.01  (0.01 
 Total number of staff -0.001  (0.002 
 Size of cohort -0.008 *** (0.003 
 School library 0.029  (0.081 
 Headmaster office -0.224 *** (0.067 
 Faculty room 0.05  (0.083 
 Video facilities 0.038  (0.091 
 TV room -0.133  (0.189 
 Copy machine 0.078  (0.051 
 Printer -0.079  (0.086 
 Overhead projector -0.009  (0.07 
 School kitchen 0.069  (0.081 
 Internet access 0.085 * (0.05 
 Computer lab -0.111 * (0.056 
 Science lab -0.041  (0.09 
 Filtered water -0.019  (0.101 
 Public water supply 0.145  (0.252 
 Public sewerage 0.022  (0.08 
 Sport facilities -0.007  (0.048 
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Table 24 continued    
HEADMASTER CHARACTERISTICS    
 Male -0.019  (0.060) 
 Age -0.001  (0.002) 
 Mixed 0.066  (0.054) 
 Black 0.052  (0.080) 
 Asian 0.167 ** (0.078) 
 Indigenous 0.036 ** (0.144) 
Highest education obtained High school 0.117  (0.188) 
 Higher education - pedagogic degree 0.014  (0.129) 
 Higher education – normal -0.077  (0.126) 
 Higher education & teaching qualification 0.033  (0.152) 
 Higher education – other 0.044  (0.132) 
 Experience in years as headmaster -0.001  (0.002) 
 Experience in years in education 0.000  (0.000) 
 Continuing education -0.055  (0.0760) 
 Earnings 0.000  (0.000) 
MEAN TEACHER CHARACTERISTICS    
 Proportion male -0.113  (0.180) 
 High school -0.149  (0.116) 
 Higher education – pedagogic degree -0.056  (0.104) 
 Higher education – regular -0.081  (0.107) 
 Higher education and teaching qualification -0.128  (0.153) 
 Higher education – other -0.126  (0.126) 
 Earnings 0.000  (0.000) 
 Mean experience in education 0.004  (0.005) 
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Table 24 continued Proportion Bolsa Família 0.147  (0.227) 
 Mean books 0.008  (0.006) 
 Proportion female 0.000  (0.275) 
 Mean HH with domestic worker 0.260  (0.471) 
 Proportion white -3.325  (1.983) 
 Proportion mixed -2.365  (1.951) 
 Proportion black -2.856  (1.830) 
 Proportion Asian -4.507 * (2.294) 
 Proportion Indigenous -2.984  (1.853) 
 Mean automobiles -0.258  (0.176) 
 Mean computers 0.091  (0.298) 
 Mean fridges -0.539 ** (0.259) 
 Mean freezers 0.381  (0.273) 
 Mean radios 0.050  (0.153) 
 Mean washing machines 0.096  (0.154) 
 Mean tumble dryer 0.144  (0.403) 
 Mean DVD players 0.109  (0.200) 
 Mean TV sets -0.013  (0.155) 
 Mean bathrooms 0.317  (0.229) 
 Mean videos -0.264  (0.250) 
 Constant 4.157 * (1.878) 
 Observations 363   
 R-squared 0.236   
Notes: The coefficients come from a linear probability model on the selected assignment rule of students into classes, where the outcome 
is a dummy taking a value of 1 if students are assigned to classes using their relative age to form homogenous classes, and 0 otherwise. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%. 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 25: Means of Student Statements on Teaching Practices and Peer Behaviour 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Teacher enforces student attention 0.918 (0.067) 
Teacher corrects homework 0.788 (0.119) 
Teacher availability to clarify doubts 0.904 (0.079) 
Teacher explains until all students understand 0.891 (0.083) 
Teacher gives opportunity to express oneself 0.850 (0.098) 
Teacher helps more some students 0.254 (0.147) 
Teacher interested in learning progress 0.917 (0.072) 
Teacher needs to wait to start teaching 0.581 (0.166) 
Teacher absenteeism 0.237 (0.130) 
Fellow students leave classroom early 0.269 (0.150) 
Fellow students are noisy and disruptive 0.527 (0.140) 
Fellow students learn taught material 0.866 (0.087) 
Fellow students pay attention in class 0.652 (0.108) 
Notes: Entries are means of the standardized categorical answers to the student questionnaire 
aggregated on the school level. The data comes from the student questionnaire of PROEB 
2007. Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: RD Estimates of Predetermined Individual Characteristics of 
the 2007 Entry Cohort 
Sex -0.069 (0.070) 
White 0.006 (0.087) 
Mixed -0.047 (0.053) 
Black 0.050 (0.060) 
Asian 0.024 (0.034) 
Indigenous 0.004 (0.006) 
Notes: Entries are separate IV estimates of the class effect on student characteristics of first 
grade students of the school entry cohort of 2007, where being in the second class has been 
instrumented by a dummy for having an age rank larger than 0. The data comes from 
official records of the 2007 school census. For each variable a separate regression has been 
estimated. All specifications include a second-order polynomial in the age rank of students. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, clustered on the school level are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 8: Test for Discontinuity of Individual and Peer Values of Pre-determined Characteristics (1)
  
Notes: The graphs plot local averages of individual values (columns 1 & 3) and of the value for the peers of the individual students 
(columns 2 & 4) according to the age ranking in the cohort as distance of students from the cut-off point and local linear regression 
fits on both sides of the cut-off point using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 3 months. 
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Figure 8 (cont.): Test for Discontinuity of Individual and Peer Values of Pre-determined Characteristics (2) 
 
Notes: The graphs plot local averages of individual values (columns 1 & 3) and of the value for the peers of the individual students 
(columns 2 & 4) according to the age ranking in the cohort as distance of students from the cut-off point and local linear regression 
fits on both sides of the cut-off point using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 3 months.  
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Figure 8 (cont.): Test for Discontinuity of Individual and Peer Values of Pre-determined Characteristics (3) 
 
Notes: The graphs plot local averages of individual values (columns 1 & 3) and of the value for the peers of the individual students 
(columns 2 & 4) according to the age ranking in the cohort as distance of students from the cut-off point and local linear regression 
fits on both sides of the cut-off point using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 3 months. 1
0
2
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3. The Effect of Violence on Birth Outcomes 
3. 1 Introduction 
In this project we analyze birth outcomes of children whose mothers were exposed to 
high levels of violence in their local environment during pregnancy. There is 
considerable evidence showing that the nine months in utero are critical in shaping a 
person’s life, affecting a variety of economic and non-economic outcomes even in 
adulthood. Although there is a small but growing literature in economics showing that 
maternal stress and exposure to extreme events, including conflict and terrorist attacks, 
during pregnancy affect birth outcomes, the impact of day-to-day violence is, by and 
large, understudied.  
Exposure to violence in utero might affect birth outcomes directly through the 
mother’s fear of victimization and psychological stress, which is in turn known to lead 
to worse birth outcomes. Violence can also affect mothers and hence the health of the 
fetus directly through victimization, with its ensuing negative economic, physical, and 
psychological consequences. Indirect effects, such as changes in labor supply, might 
also be at play, with effects on household income, increased difficulties in, or higher 
costs of, accessing local health services due to safety concerns, or even changes in 
fertility, possibly affecting observed birth outcomes through selection. Additionally, 
resource diversion on the part of both households and communities in order to prevent 
or counteract violence might lead to reductions in expenditures associated with 
children’s well-being.  
This analysis focuses on Brazil, a country with one of the highest levels of 
violence worldwide (UNODC, 2011), with a homicide rate of 21 deaths per 100,000 
population (as of 2011), approximately five times the rate in the United States and 
almost 20 times the rate in the United Kingdom. Homicide is the leading cause of death 
in men aged 15-44 (Reichenheim et al., 2011), and day-to-day violence is a top concern 
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among citizens of Brazil. In the 2010 Latinobarometer, about 16 percent of Brazilian 
respondents listed violence and public security as the most important problem 
(Latinobarometer, 2010), and existing estimates put the direct costs of violence and 
crime at between 3 and 5 percent of annual GDP (Couttolene, Cano, Piquet Carneiro, 
and Phebo, 2000; Kahn 1999; Heinemann and Verner, 2006; Velasco Rondon and 
Viegas, 2003; World Bank, 2006).
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In order to assess the impact of violence on birth outcomes, we combine 
microdata on all births for 11 years (2000 to 2010) from official birth records with 
information on all homicides that occurred over the same period obtained from official 
death records. Vital statistics provide the date of birth and the place of residence of the 
mother up to the municipality level. Similarly, for homicides, the data provide 
information on the date and municipality of occurrence of the death. This allows us to 
identify the incidence of homicides during different stages of pregnancy in the mother’s 
municipality of residence. 
Homicide rates are often used as crime and violence indicators (UNODC, 
2011).
61
 Evidence for Brazil, in particular, shows a close correlation between different 
forms of violent crime and homicides (World Bank, 2006).
62
 Because of their severity, 
underreporting is not generally a concern (Heinemann and Verner, 2006), and 
homicides are more likely to be followed up by police investigations and media 
coverage relative to other types of crime, making them particularly visible to the public. 
As uniform crime reports are not publicly available for Brazil, homicide rates from 
                                                 
60
 Methodologies such as contingent valuation surveys and willingness-to-pay methods (see Soares 2010 
for a description of the methods and a survey of the findings) have not been applied in the Brazilian 
context.  
61
 In order to measure local violence we use local homicide rates. Homicides data are considered among 
the most representative and comparable crime and violence indicators and serve as a frequently used and 
reasonable proxy for violence (UNODC 2011). In contrast, other forms of violence that may be reported 
in surveys are subject to biases as a measure of the severity of violent episodes may depend on subjective 
perceptions. 
62
 A significant proportion of murders in Brazil is associated with drug trafficking and the ensuing 
disputes over territory, distribution, and leadership (UNODC, 2005). Murders based on drug trafficking—
but not exclusively those—are related to a wide variety of other violent activities, such as robberies, 
kidnapping, assaults, and muggings (Heinemann and Verner, 2006). 
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death records constitute a unique source of information on violence that is uniform 
across space and time. 
The rich information available in the vital statistics data allows us to measure the 
effects of violence on a variety of outcomes, including birthweight, APGAR scores, 
gestational length and infant mortality, as well as potential margins of selection due to 
fertility, abortion, and miscarriage.  
Identification is based on a difference-in-differences strategy across 
geographical areas and time (conditional, in some specifications, on municipality linear 
trends). This allows us to obtain credible estimates of causal impact and provides the 
opportunity for a falsification test. The sheer amount of data helps us obtain precise 
estimates: this is crucial, as some of these phenomena (e.g., infant mortality) are rare 
events and their statistical—although not necessarily their economic—magnitude may 
be very small and hard to detect in sample surveys. Using information on gestation 
allows us to reconstruct the date of conception rather than relying on date of birth. This 
allows us to obtain estimates of the impact of homicides on birth outcomes (e.g. 
birthweight) that are correlated with length of gestation and that are free of potential 
selection bias when using date of birth. 
Most of the analysis focuses on small – primarily rural – municipalities (with 
populations of less than 5,000), for which municipality-level homicide rates provide a 
localized measure of violence. These small municipalities form a more homogeneous 
group of municipalities and for these it is more credible that the homicide rate is a 
measure of local violence and that it exerts enough variation over time.  
To preempt our results, we show that in small municipalities, one extra homicide 
during pregnancy leads to an increase in the probability of low birthweight (<2.5 kg.) of 
around half a percentage point, a 6 percent increase relative to baseline (8 percent). 
Consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature, the effect seems to be concentrated 
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in the first trimester of pregnancy. The estimated effect is economically meaningful, 
being approximately ten times the effect estimated for the United States of being a 
recipient of Food Stamps (Almond, Hoynes, and Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2011) 
(although clearly a much larger fraction of households are in receipt of Food Stamps 
compared to those exposed to homicides). The effect seems to be largely driven by 
increased prematurity rather than intrauterine growth retardation. We find no effect on 
child mortality or margins of endogenous fertility.  
 
3.2 Birth Outcomes and In Utero Experiences: The Effect of Exposure to Violence 
The consequences of low birthweight and fetal health more generally on long-run 
outcomes, such as educational attainment, later life health, mortality, and labor market 
performance have been established in a large body of literature (Alderman and 
Behrman, 2006; Almond, Chay, and Lee, 2005; Almond and Currie, 2011b; Currie, 
2011; Currie and Moretti, 2007; Royer, 2009; Victora, Kirkwood, Ashworth, Black, 
Rogers, Sazawal, Campbell, and Gore; 1999). Low-birthweight infants display a 
substantially increased risk of neonatal or infant death and are more likely to require 
additional outpatient care and hospitalization during childhood, adding to the private 
and social costs of poor birth outcomes. Of those living into adulthood, some may suffer 
from cognitive and neurological impairment, conditions typically associated with lower 
productivity in a range of educational, economic, and other activities, as well as from 
increased morbidity (e.g., risk of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and hypertension). 
The importance of fetal shocks and of the circumstances in utero on birth and 
later life outcomes has only been recently acknowledged by economists, leading to 
resurgent interest both in the theoretical and in the empirical literature. There are now 
numerous empirical studies showing that, consistent with Barker’s fetal origin 
hypothesis, the nine months in utero constitute a critical period of a person’s life, 
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shaping subsequent health, educational, and labor market outcomes (Almond and 
Currie, 2011a; Almond and Currie, 2011b; Currie, 2011).  
Almond and Currie (2011a) categorize factors affecting the prenatal 
environment into three groups: those affecting maternal and thereby fetal health (such as 
nutrition and infection), economic shocks, and environmental pollution. A number of 
studies, in particular, have established a link between household maternal nutrition and 
birth outcomes, especially birthweight, one of the most important and easiest to measure 
predictors of economic and non-economic outcomes in adulthood. Some studies focus 
on the role of redistributive policies (see, for example, Almond, Hoynes, and Whitmore 
Schanzenbach, 2011 on the U.S. Food Stamps program and Amarante, Manacorda, 
Miguel, and Vigorito, 2011 on the Uruguayan PANES), while others focus on the role 
of famines, natural disasters, or even fasting during pregnancy (Almond, 2006; Almond 
and Mazumder, 2011; Banerjee, Duflo, Postel-Vinay, and Watts, 2010). For Brazil, 
Rocha and Soares (2012) show that negative weather shocks during pregnancies lead to 
a significant reduction in gestational length and birthweight. Other studies focus instead 
on the disease environment during pregnancy (see Almond, 2006 and Kelly, 2011 on 
maternal influenza and Barreca, 2010 for maternal exposure to malaria) and on 
pollution (Currie and Walker, 2011; Chay and Greenstone, 2003 on air pollution, 
Almond, Edlund and Palme, 2009 on nuclear fallout, and Reyes, 2007 and Nilsson, 
2011 on leaded gasoline), showing that both play substantial roles in affecting birth and 
later outcomes. 
Despite evidence that maternal stress during pregnancy negatively affects 
cognition, health, and educational attainment of children through elevated levels of the 
stress hormone cortisol (Aizer, Stroud, and Buka; 2009), presumably because of data 
limitations, the effect of exposure to crime and violence on birth outcomes has received 
considerably less attention.  
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A stream of literature focuses on terrorist attacks and conflict. Camacho (2008) 
finds that landmine explosions during the first trimester of pregnancy have a significant 
negative effect on birthweight in Colombia, with one extra landmine explosion during 
pregnancy leading to a decrease in birthweight by 8.7 grams. Ecclestone (2012) shows 
that exposure to the 9/11 terror attacks among pregnant women in New York City led to 
a reduction in birthweight of between 12 and 14 grams and an elevated level of 
prematurity. In a setting closer to ours, Mansour and Rees (2012) find a modest but 
imprecisely estimated increase in the fraction of low birthweight infants in response to 
an increase in noncombatant fatalities in the West Bank and Gaza during the second 
Intifada.
63
  
Although clearly related to this chapter, these studies focus on the effect of rare, 
extreme events, implying that their findings may not necessarily be applicable in other 
settings where violence is endemic.  
 
3.3 Background, Trends, and Data  
3.3.1 Births and Birth Outcomes 
In order to characterize the distribution of birthweight and other birth outcomes, in this 
chapter we use microdata from birth certificates, which are collected by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health through DATASUS, literally the Departamento de Informática do 
Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS).
64 
The data provide a large array of information on 
pregnancy and newborns’ outcomes as well as on mothers’ characteristics. Coverage is 
                                                 
63
 There is very little evidence on the effect of mother’s victimization. One exception is Aizer (2011), 
which shows that mother’s domestic-violence-induced hospitalization considerably reduces birthweight. 
64
 The information on births is first collected by the health institution where the birth took place and then 
forwarded to the state’s health secretariat (via means of the municipal health secretariat), which in turn is 
responsible for entering the information into the central database (FUNASA 2001). In the rare case of a 
home birth, this information is submitted by medical staff attending the birth. 
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practically universal: data from the 2010 population census show that more than 99 
percent of children born between 2000 and 2010 indeed have birth certificates.  
Summary statistics for the period 2000-2010 are reported in the top panel of 
Table 27. The data provide information on more than 30 million births over the period. 
As said, the primary units of observation in the analysis are municipalities, relatively 
small geographical units roughly equivalent to a U.S. county. In the table we have 
information on 5,508 municipalities.
65
 At total population of just over 181 million, each 
of these municipalities accounts on average for 33,000 individuals. Obviously, however, 
population size varies tremendously across municipalities: while São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro account for more than 11 and 6 million inhabitants respectively, more than 20 
percent of municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. For this reason, in the table 
we present results for all of Brazil (column (1)) and separately for the different classes 
of municipalities based on population size. For this we use the standard classification 
from the National Statistical Office (IBGE) (population 1 to 5,000; 5,001 to 20,000; 
20,001 to 100,000; 100,001 to 500,000 and 500,001 or more). Smaller municipalities 
account for around 2 percent percent of all births. 
The table illustrates that, with an incidence of low birthweight (less than 2.5 kg.) 
of around 8 percent, Brazil ranges above the average for OECD countries but 
considerably below the highest rates in some low-income countries (UNICEF, 2006). 
Around respectively one and half a percent of children are born with very low (<1.5 kg.) 
and extremely low (<1 kg.) birthweight. The data also provide information on APGAR 
scores, gestational length, gender, race, and a number of mother characteristics. 
Roughly speaking, birth outcomes are worse the greater the municipality size, although 
children in very large municipalities (>500,000) seem to perform better than children in 
large municipalities (100,000 to 500,000) among a number of dimensions. 
                                                 
65
 We have excluded the few municipalities that split into newer municipalities between 2000 and 2010. 
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 Figure 9, left-hand side panel, reports average (across the entire period) low-
birthweight rates in all Brazilian municipalities: darker areas correspond to 
municipalities with greater incidence of low birthweight. The municipalities with the 
highest rates of low birthweight are clustered mainly in a number of states, Maranhão 
and Amapá, in the Northeast and North, respectively, as well in the Southeastern states 
of Minas Gerais and São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul in the South. 
 
3.3.2 Infant Mortality 
The middle panel of table 27 reports data on infant mortality. Data come from death 
certificates, which are also collected by DATASUS, and record very detailed causes of 
death, including non-natural deaths classified as homicides that we use below, as well as 
the date and municipality of occurrence of the death. The data also provide information 
on infant mortality. Infant mortality data refer to children born alive for which a birth 
certificate has been produced, and hence exclude fetal deaths.  
The data allow us to estimate four rates: early neonatal mortality (within seven 
days since birth), neonatal mortality (within 28 days since birth), perinatal mortality 
(within the first 22 weeks since birth) and infant mortality (within the first year since 
birth). At nine deaths per 1,000 children, early neonatal mortality accounts for the bulk 
of deaths within the first year of life. Infant mortality is on average 14 per 1,000 
children. Again, there is a clear gradient across municipalities, with larger municipality 
size being associated with worse outcomes, and with very large municipalities being 
somewhat below trend. 
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3.3.3 Homicides 
The third panel of Table 27 reports data on homicides. These and all other aggregate 
statistics in the rest of the table that vary only by municipality and time are weighted by 
the number of births, meaning that municipality X times mean receives a weight 
proportional to the number of births in that cell.  
For the period 2000-2010, more than 528,000 homicides are recorded, 
equivalent to a yearly homicide rate of around 26 per 100,000 individuals. Again, 
homicide rates tend to be higher the larger the municipality. Still, even in small 
municipalities, the homicide rate is 9 per 100,000 individuals. The data also provide 
location of death. This can be in a health institution, in one’s home, in the street, or 
elsewhere. Clearly, when the death occurred in a health institution, the homicide might 
have been committed elsewhere, possibly even in another municipality, inducing 
considerable error in the measure of local violence that we use. The subsequent rows of 
the table show that around 40 percent of deaths resulting from homicides happen in the 
street and around 50 percent either in the street or in one’s residence. Interestingly, the 
latter is only 44 percent in very large municipalities, where hospitals are typically 
located. This suggests that a fraction of homicides for which the death occurs in 
hospitals are likely to be committed in other municipalities. Because of this, in most of 
the analysis we focus on homicides for which the death occurred in the street. These are 
also likely to be the most visible and hence stress-inducing homicides, which might 
possibly affect pregnancy outcomes.  
The middle panel of Figure 9 reports the distribution of homicide rates (in the 
street) across Brazilian municipalities. Municipalities with higher incidence of 
homicides are in the more densely populated and more urbanized areas along the 
coastline, as well as in the state of Bahia in the Northeast of Brazil. Municipalities with 
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high rates of homicides are also to be found in the less densely populated states of Mato 
Grosso and Pará, covering some of the Amazon region.  
Although this is not immediately evident in Figure 9, once differences in 
population size across municipalities are taken into account, a clear positive correlation 
between local homicide rates and low birthweight emerges. This is shown in Figure 10, 
left hand-side panel, which plots the cross-sectional relationship between the fraction of 
low-weight births and the annual homicide rate (in the street) across all Brazilian 
municipalities. A predicted regression line is also superimposed and larger circles 
correspond to larger cities. The data clearly show that, across municipalities, higher 
homicide rates are associated with worse birth outcomes: the estimated coefficient is 1.6 
per thousand births and highly significant at conventional levels, implying that one extra 
homicide out of 100,000 people is associated with 1.6 extra low-weight births out of 
1,000 births. It is also clear that larger municipalities tend to outperform smaller 
municipalities along both of these dimensions. One possible interpretation of these 
correlations is that higher homicides rates are responsible for worse birth outcomes. 
This conclusion may be unwarranted, as different municipalities vary in characteristics 
which are potentially associated with both birth outcomes and mortality rates. 
Indeed, the bottom part of Table 27 shows that municipalities of different sizes 
vary along a number of dimensions, such as income, literacy rate, and rates of 
urbanization. These data (like most of the municipality-level data that we use in the 
regressions) come from decennial population censuses.
66
 There is evidence that larger 
municipalities outperform smaller ones in many socioeconomic dimensions, such as 
literacy rate and per capita income. 
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 The majority of the data come from population census micro-data. Additional variables have been 
obtained from DATASUS. 
(http://www2.datasus.gov.br/DATASUS/index.php?area=0206andVObj=http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/
deftohtm.exe?ibge/censo/cnv/crianpobr). Data are available for 2000 and 2010 and we have then 
interpolated linearly across these two dates to estimate their value in every intervening month. 
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Differences in socioeconomic status and living standards across areas are also 
evident in the right-hand side panel of Figure 9, which displays average household 
income by municipality, with higher income being represented by darker areas. The 
Southeastern states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and parts of Minas Gerais are those 
with the highest average household income. 
 
3.4 Econometric Methodology  
As already emphasized, the difficulty in estimating the causal effect of violence on birth 
outcomes is that characteristics of different residential areas are unobservable to the 
econometrician. Some of these unobservable characteristics might be correlated with 
both newborns’ health outcomes and homicide rates, even in the absence of a causal 
effect of violence on birth outcomes. For example, children born in poorer areas are 
more likely to display negative birth outcomes due to the lower socioeconomic 
characteristics of their parents or worse provision of health services in their 
neighborhood, and, possibly, to be exposed to a higher (or lower) degree of violence. In 
this case, one would erroneously conclude that higher homicide rates lead to worse (or 
better) birth outcomes, a classic case of failed inference based on observational data. 
In order to circumvent this problem, we propose to use a simple difference-in-
differences identification strategy that relies on differential changes in homicide rates 
across municipality and time: this provides a way to control for unobserved time-
invariant municipality characteristics and to subsume aggregate time effects. The 
identification strategy exploits the change in homicide rates over time while controlling 
for municipality and time fixed effects; because there is imperfect control over the 
timing of conception and no foresight over future homicides the change in the homicide 
rate can be considered conditionally random. 
In formulas we estimate the following model: 
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Ymt=β0+β1 HOMmt+ Xmt β 3+ dm +dt +umt   (6) 
where Ymt is the average outcome variable (birthweight, still birth, infant mortality, 
APGAR scores, gestational length, etc.) in municipality m at time t, HOMmt is the local 
homicide rate, Xmt are vectors of average (across all individuals in each cell) individual 
characteristics as well as time-varying municipality-level characteristics, dm and dt are 
respectively municipality and time-fixed effects, and u is an error term. We estimate 
equation (6) on aggregate month X municipality level data, which is the level of 
variation of the homicide data (rather than on individual data), for computational 
purposes. All regressions are estimated using WLS, with weights given by the number 
of births in each cell. 
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the effect of the homicide rate at different 
stages of pregnancy (i.e., first, second, and third trimester) and test for the validity of 
the identification assumption by introducing in the regressions additional pre- and post-
pregnancy homicide rates as additional regressors. One would expect homicide rates 
pre- and post-pregnancy not to affect birth outcomes: finding a significant coefficient on 
the latter would point to a violation of the identification assumption. 
In the following, we measure trimesters of pregnancy starting from the date of 
conception. We recover the latter based on the child’s date of birth minus the length of 
gestation. As the length of gestation is recorded in intervals in our data (<22, 23-27, 28-
31, 32-36, 37-41, >41 weeks), we use the mid-point of each interval. This approach has 
multiple advantages. First, it allows us to correctly measure exposure in different 
trimesters of pregnancy, which would not be possible if we counted retrospectively 
since the time of birth (as typically done in this literature) and ignored the variation in 
the length of gestation across pregnancies. Second, it allows us to directly estimate the 
effect of homicides on the length of gestation, a potentially interesting outcome in itself. 
Third, and related to the latter, it allows us to obtain estimates of the impact of 
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homicides on other outcomes (e.g. birthweight) that are correlated with length of 
gestation and that are free of potential selection bias.  
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Birthweight 
Table 28 presents estimates of equation (6) for small municipalities (<5,000 
individuals). Small municipalities are concentrated in a few states (Tocantins, Piauí, 
Goiás, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul) and geographically rather 
dispersed (see Figure 12). The table reports results on average birthweight (in grams) 
and on the fraction of low, very low, and extremely low-weight births (per 1,000 births). 
Column (1) of Table 28 reports a simple difference-in-differences estimate for the effect 
of the homicide rate on average birthweight in the first, second, and third trimesters 
since conception. Regressions include only municipality and month of conception fixed 
effects. Homicide rates here are computed at the quarterly level (i.e., number of 
homicides per quarter over total population). The data show a negative and very 
precisely estimated effect of the homicide rate in the first trimester of gestation on 
birthweight. The estimated effect of an increase by one in the number of quarterly 
homicides per 100,000 individuals in column (1) is just below half a gram (-0.43 
grams.) This implies that in an average municipality in this class (around 3,700 
individuals), one extra homicide will lead to a reduction in average birthweight among 
children exposed to that homicide in their first trimester of pregnancy of around 12 
grams (=(0.43 X 100,000) /3,700). This is a small effect, on the order of 0.4 percent 
relative to an average birthweight of 3.210 kg. For comparison, for Colombia, Camacho 
(2008) finds that one landmine explosion during early pregnancy reduces birthweight by 
7.5 grams. 
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The estimates for the second and third trimester are positive, much smaller in 
magnitude but not significant at any conventional levels. This is in line with findings 
elsewhere in the literature that stress induced by extreme events matters mostly during 
the first trimester of gestation (Camacho, 2008; Torche, 2011; Mansour and Rees, 
2012).  
Column (2) controls for a very rich set of mother and child characteristics and 
time-varying municipality characteristics from census data (see notes to Table 28), 
including municipality-specific linear time trends and municipality x calendar month 
(January to December) effects. Results are essentially unchanged relative to column (1), 
lending credibility to the identification assumption that—conditional on time- and 
municipality-fixed effects—the variation in the homicide rate across municipalities and 
time is almost as good as random. In column (3), we additionally include homicide rates 
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth trimester since conception, that is - for pregnancies of 
normal gestational length - in the first, second, and third trimester since birth and 
homicide rates in the three trimesters before conception. The inclusion of these 
variables makes virtually no difference to the results while we find no significant 
coefficients on the different lead and lag variables, lending support to our identification 
assumption. Figure 11 plots the point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval of the 
effect of homicide rate on birthweight and low birthweight for the three trimesters prior 
to conception, and the six trimesters after conception. Only the coefficient for the first 
trimester in utero reveals a significant negative effect, while the point estimates for the 
other quarters are much smaller and not significant. 
Results in the following columns of the Table confirm these findings and show 
that homicides have a particularly pronounced effect at the bottom tail of the 
birthweight distribution. We find significant effect of homicides in the first trimester the 
fraction of low, very low, and extremely low-weight births of, respectively, 0.17, 0.06, 
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and 0.04 per 1,000 births. In turn this means that one extra homicide in a small 
municipality will lead to an increase in the fraction of low, very low, and extremely low 
birthweight children of 0.5 (=(0.17/10) X 100,000 / 3,700), 0.2 and 0.1 percentage 
points, that is, respectively a 6, 16, and 21 percent increase (relative to a baseline 
incidence of 0.078, 0.010, and 0.005). 
 
3.5.2 Additional Outcomes 
Table 29 reports regression results on a number of additional outcomes. For brevity, we 
report only specifications with the entire set of controls as in column (2) of Table 28. 
Column (1) reports the effect of homicides on gestational length. Indeed, homicides in 
the first trimester increase prematurity, by lowering gestational length. Column (2) 
reports the effect on APGAR scores. We use the average score one minute and five 
minutes post birth in an attempt to boost precision: still we find no evidence of a 
significant effect of increased levels of violence on this outcome.  
 Columns (3) to (6) report the effects on mortality rates at different intervals 
since birth. The dependent variable here is the fraction of deaths per thousand children 
born alive. Again, there is no evidence of violence affecting child mortality rates.  
Columns (7) and (8) report estimates of impact on birthweight and low 
birthweight only for pregnancies of normal gestational length, defined as pregnancies of 
37 weeks or more. We report results on birthweight and the fraction of low-birthweight 
children (as in columns (2) and (5) of Table 28). Interestingly, results on birthweight 
disappear. Combined with the findings in column (3) of Table 29, this suggests that 
violence leads to greater rates of prematurity and, via this, to increased risk of low 
birthweight. 
The last concern we have pertains to selective fertility. Violence might affect 
birth outcomes through the selection that it operates on the number of children who are 
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eventually born. This can happen through a variety of margins: selective sexual activity 
or contraception use, selective fetal mortality, abortion, and miscarriage. In order to 
study these combined effects, in column (9) of Table 29 we report a regression of the 
log number of births by municipality and time on the same variables as in columns (1) 
to (8) with the exception of mother characteristics. As in the other regressions, we 
control for the age and gender structure of the population in each municipality X time 
cell. The latter allows us to control for differences in the population at risk (women of 
fertile age) across cells. We find very small and statistically insignificant effects on 
fertility, implying that selection along this margin is unlikely to explain our results. 
 
3.5.3 Alternative Definitions of Homicide 
In Tables 28 and 29, we restrict reporting to homicides for which the death occurred in 
the street. Table 30 reports results using, respectively, homicides in the street and in 
one’s residence (columns (1) to (5)) and  all homicides, that is, also those for which 
death occurred in health institutions (columns (6) to (10)). Using additionally homicides 
for which the death occurred in residences makes virtually no difference to our results. 
Estimates, however, become smaller and less precise when we use all homicides: this is 
consistent with the notion that homicides for which the death occurred in hospital 
provide an error-ridden measure of local violence. 
 
3.5.4 Heterogeneous Effects by Mother’s Education 
To conclude, in Table 31 we report separate regression results for infants born to 
mothers with incomplete and complete primary education (8 years of schooling) 
respectively. Each of these two groups account, roughly, for 50 percent of births. The 
effect seems to manifest largely among children of poorly educated mothers. Although 
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results for highly educated mothers are qualitatively similar, point estimates are 
typically smaller and statistical significance is lower. It appears that violence adds up to 
the disadvantage that children of poorly educated mothers already suffer as a result of 
their household’s lower socioeconomic status. 
 
3.6. Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
Using a very rich dataset on the universe of births and homicides from vital statistics 
data over the period 2000-2010, we estimate the effect of in-utero exposure to 
homicides on a range of birth outcomes in small Brazilian municipalities. We find a 
significant negative effect of exposure to violence during the first trimester on 
birthweight, which is in line with findings on the effect of other stress-related shocks 
during pregnancy in the literature. We also find significant and large positive effects of 
homicides on the probability of low birthweight, implying that the effects are 
particularly pronounced at the bottom tail of the birthweight distribution. Our results are 
robust to the introduction of maternal and municipal socioeconomic controls, including 
municipality-specific linear time trends. A falsification exercise, consisting of testing 
for the effect of pre- and post-pregnancy homicide rates on birth outcomes, lends further 
credibility to our identification assumption. 
We show that violence in the first trimester of pregnancy affects birth outcomes 
through reduced gestational length. Increased prematurity hence, rather than intrauterine 
growth retardation, seems to explain the pronounced effect on low birthweight that we 
have documented in the chapter. 
As violence might affect the probability of appearing in the data set through 
changes in fertility or possibly via abortion or miscarriage, one concern in that our 
results might be driven by selection. That is, there may be a differential response to 
increased levels of violence among women with differential propensity to give birth to 
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low-weight infants. Despite this concern, we find no evidence of homicides affecting 
fertility outcomes. 
Finally, we show that results are largely concentrated among poorly educated 
mothers, that is, those with less than completed primary education. This suggests that 
violence adds up to the mechanisms that affect the transmission of socioeconomic status 
between parents and their offspring. 
Although our estimates for the effect of one extra homicide in small 
municipalities are economically meaningful, high homicide rates are not responsible for 
the high level of low birthweight in Brazil. This is because overall, homicides are rather 
rare events. At current rates, and if one is willing to extrapolate the estimates from small 
municipalities to the whole of Brazil, our back-of-the-envelope calculations show that 
homicide rates account only for a minimal fraction (0.01%) of total low-birthweight 
incidence in the country. 
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics 
 All By municipality size 
 
 <5000 5,000-
19,999 
20,000-
99,999 
100,001-
500,000 
>500,000 
Number of municipalities 5,508 1,289 2,648 1,320 215 36 
       
Number of births 30,367,939 616,733 4,491,073 8,808,710 7,254,770 9,106,653 
Birthweight 3184.190 3,210.62 3,222.315 3,207.675 3,164.246 3,156.751 
Low birthweight 0.087 0.078 0.080 0.082 0.092 0.082 
Very low birthweight 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.011 
Extremely low birthweight 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 
Gestational length 38.690 38.751 38.755 38.748 38.659 38.622 
APGAR – 1 minute 8.144 8.143 8.073 8.109 8.185 8.176 
APGAR – 5 minutes 9.235 9.300 9.226 9.242 9.250 9.216 
Female 0.512 0.514 0.513 0.513 0.512 0.512 
White 0.502 0.598 0.471 0.459 0.561 0.508 
Prenatal visits 5.705 5.803 5.446 5.458 5.889 5.920 
Mother’s age 26.168 26.022 26.223 25.744 25.933 26.754 
Mother never married 0.613 0.563 0.633 0.657 0.622 0.601 
Mother’s years of schooling 7.826 7.745 7.256 7.695 8.865 7.736 
       
Early neonatal mortality  
(1 wk.) 9.121 8.000 8.832 9.110 11.881 7.042 
Neonatal mortality (4 wks.) 11.211 9.767 10.625 10.901 14.486 9.184 
1
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 Table 27 continued       
Perinatal mortality (22 wks.) 13.595 11.973 13.129 13.441 16.923 11.316 
Infant mortality (1 year) 14.706 12.951 14.446 14.746 17.986 12.170 
       
Homicide rate 26.284 9.102 12.832 19.381 32.650 36.613 
Homicide rate, in the street 10.972 2.498 4.284 7.903 14.574 15.330 
Homicide rate, in the street  
and in homes 
13.888 4.691 6.855 10.794 17.999 18.067 
       
Population 1,170,281 3,703 12,638 49,120 250,081 3,887,465 
Urbanization rate 0.822 0.531 0.574 0.721 0.937 0.984 
HH income 2010 $R 1,100.41 582.53 571.05 752.81 1,150.36 1,663.70 
Literacy rate 0.817 0.758 0.723 0.755 0.848 0.878 
Source: DATASUS and IBGE population census.  
Notes: All entries are weighted by the number of births. Neonatal and infant mortality rates are expressed as a fraction per 1,000 
live births. Homicide rates are expressed as a fraction per 100,000 population.  
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Table 28: The Effect of Homicides during Pregnancy on Birthweight by Trimester since Conception – Small Municipalities 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Trimester 
Birthweight  
(grams) 
Low birthweight  
(x 1,000) 
Very low birthweight  
(x 1,000) 
Extremely low birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
1 (pre-conception)   -0.0439   0.0011   -0.0161   -0.0081 
   (0.1037)   (0.0480)   (0.0184)   (0.0121) 
2 (pre-conception)   -0.1344   0.0621   0.0322   0.0279* 
   (0.1090)   (0.0531)   (0.0232)   (0.0151) 
3 (pre-conception)   -0.0954   0.0036   0.0006   -0.0123 
   (0.1021)   (0.0494)   (0.0191)   (0.0111) 
1  -0.4328** -0.4506*** -0.4551*** 0.1488* 0.1680** 0.1709** 0.05563 0.0580* 0.0593* 0.0403 0.0393 0.0416* 
 
(0.1722) (0.1627) (0.1625) (0.0890) (0.0836) (0.0839) (0.0354) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0252) 
2  0.0192 0.0568 0.0507 0.0688 0.0584 0.0624 -0.0310 -0.0356 -0.0336 -0.0149 -0.0209 -0.0183 
 
(0.2030) (0.1918) (0.1920) (0.0956) (0.0890) (0.0891) (0.0342) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0240) 
3  0.0214 -0.0486 -0.0523 -0.0272 0.0038 0.0059 0.0399 0.0407 0.0418 0.0221 0.0194 0.0212 
 
(0.1967) (0.1885) (0.1904) (0.0882) (0.0859) (0.0862) (0.0415) (0.0408) (0.0414) (0.0315) (0.0305) (0.0313) 
4 (post-birth) 
  
-0.0946 
  
0.0513 
  
0.0380 
  
0.0285 
   
(0.1802) 
  
(0.0850) 
  
(0.0380) 
  
(0.0314) 
5 (post-birth) 
  
-0.0313 
  
0.0095 
  
0.0056 
  
0.0271 
   
(0.1898) 
  
(0.0842) 
  
(0.0459) 
  
(0.0373) 
6 (post-birth) 
  
-0.1005 
  
0.0806 
  
0.0286 
  
0.0480 
   
(0.2086) 
  
(0.0944) 
  
(0.0402) 
  
(0.0373) 
    
Municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pregnancy controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mother controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column reports the results from a separate regression of the dependent variable on the local quarterly homicide rate in different trimesters since the month of conception. 
Homicide rates are expressed as fraction per 100,000 individuals. Fraction birthweight is expressed per 1,000 live births. Regressions are run on cells defined by municipality and time of 
conception with weights equal to the number of births by cell. Controls include number of newborns by gender and race (black, white, mixed, Asian, indigenous) and number of multiple 
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births (twins, triplets, more than three children). Mother controls include age (10-19, 20-39, etc.), marital status (single, married, divorced, widowed), years of completed education (no 
education, 1-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12 and more), average number of previously born alive children and of stillbirths. Municipality controls include fraction of households with possession of radio, 
TV, washing machine, telephone, computer, and fraction with access to piped water, waste collection, electricity, fraction of the population by gender and age, fraction of adult population 
literate, average years of schooling in the population, fraction of families with Bolsa Família, health establishments and nurses per capita, unemployment rate, urbanization rate, fraction of 
children in work, interaction of municipality with calendar month and municipality trends. Clustered standard errors by municipality in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Number of cell observations: 136,711 (616,733 births). 
 
 
 
Table 29: Homicide Rates and Additional Birth Outcomes by Trimester since Conception – Small Municipalities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Gestational 
length  
(weeks) 
APGAR 
score  
(avg. 1 & 5 
minutes) 
Child mortality rates 
(x 1,000) 
 
Only pregnancies of 
normal gestation length 
(37 weeks or more) 
Log 
number of 
births 
Trimester   Early 
neonatal 
(1 week) 
Neonatal 
(4 weeks) 
Perinatal 
(22 weeks) 
Infant  
(1 year) 
Weight Low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
 
1  -0.0011* -0.1199 -0.0384 0.0201 0.0510 0.0872 -0.1877 0.0884 0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.4685) (0.1131) (0.1345) (0.1558) (0.1599) (0.1558) (0.0689) (0.0001) 
2  0.0004 0.1905 0.1190 0.0754 0.1512 0.1197 -0.0073 0.0519 -0.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.4673) (0.1289) (0.1379) (0.1468) (0.1558) (0.1860) (0.0731) (0.0001) 
3  -0.0005 -0.1657 0.0410 -0.0415 -0.0500 -0.0874 0.0541 -0.0560 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.4851) (0.1148) (0.1190) (0.1376) (0.1330) (0.1796) (0.0739) (0.0001) 
          
Municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pregnancy controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Mother controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Dependent variable in columns 3 to 6 is fraction of children dead per 1,000 live births. See also notes to Table 28. 
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Table 30: The Effect of Homicides during Pregnancy on Birthweight by Trimester since Conception –Alternative Definition of Homicide Rate 
- Small Municipalities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Homicides in the street and in one’s home  All homicides 
Trimester 
Birthweight 
(grams) 
Low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Very low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Extremely 
low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Gestational 
length 
(weeks) 
 Birthweight 
(grams) 
Low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Very low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Extremely 
low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Gestational 
length 
(weeks) 
1  -0.3308*** 0.0816 0.0588** 0.0480** -0.0007*  -0.1674* 0.0156 0.0179 0.0177 -0.0002 
 
(0.1250) (0.0616) (0.0279) (0.0218) (0.0004)  (0.0904) (0.0464) (0.0193) (0.0143) (0.0003) 
2  -0.0039 0.0731 -0.0206 -0.0113 0.0004  -0.0133 0.0259 -0.0329* -0.0226 0.0005* 
 
(0.1331) (0.0619) (0.0247) (0.0196) (0.0003)  (0.1070) (0.0499) (0.0183) (0.0141) (0.0003) 
3  -0.0272 0.0046 0.0309 0.0170 -0.0002  0.0327 -0.0380 0.0054 -0.0019 -0.0001 
 
(0.1389) (0.0635) (0.0277) (0.0203) (0.0003)  (0.1003) (0.0487) (0.0198) (0.0146) (0.0003) 
           
Municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pregnancy controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: See notes to Table 28. 
 
 
 
 
  
1
3
2
 
133 
 
 
Table 31: Homicide Rates and Additional Birth Outcomes by Trimester since Conception – by Mother’s Education – 
Small Municipalities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Incomplete primary education  Completed primary education 
Trimester 
Birthweight 
(grams) 
Low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Gestational 
length 
(weeks) 
APGAR 
score 
(avg. 1 & 5 
minutes) 
 Birthweight 
(grams) 
Low 
birthweight 
(x 1,000) 
Gestational 
length 
(weeks) 
APGAR 
score 
(avg. 1 & 5 
minutes) 
1   -0.4738**        0.1630        -0.0011         -0.2976         -0.2775        0.1208        -0.0008         0.1086       
 
(0.2182)         (0.1188)         (0.0007)       (0.6173)         (0.2608)         (0.1221)         (0.0008)        (0.5834)        
2  0.1104       0.1224         0.0009     0.1349        -0.1116       -0.0546         0.0001     0.5817       
 
(0.2427)         (0.1148)         (0.0006)        (0.5814)          (0.2748)         (0.1288)         (0.0008)        (0.5922)         
3  -0.0325        -0.0941        -0.0003        0.3337         -0.1436        0.1725        -0.0007        -0.7016        
 
(0.2521)         (0.1140)         (0.0006)         (0.6216)          (0.2557)         (0.1208)         (0.0007)         (0.5512)         
         
Municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pregnancy controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Incomplete primary education corresponds to less than 8 years of completed education. Number of observations in columns 1 to 4 is 115,922 while 
in columns 5 to 8 this is 109,510. See also notes to Table 28. 
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Table 32: The Effect of Homicides during Pregnancy on Birthweight by Trimester since Conception – By Municipality Size 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Trimester 5,001-20,000 20,001-100,000 100,001-500,000 >500,000 
1 (pre conception)  -0.0109  -0.0174  0.0769  -0.2723 
  (0.0648)  (0.0657)  (0.1302)  (0.3754) 
2 (pre conception)  -0.0131  -0.0562  0.0885  -0.3816* 
  (0.0573)  (0.0718)  (0.1144)  (0.2226) 
3 (pre conception)  -0.0314  0.0629  0.0570  0.1392 
  (0.0605)  (0.0792)  (0.1208)  (0.3214) 
1 0.0911 0.1296 -0.1452 -0.0399 0.903 0.0209 0.3289 0.9670** 
 
(0.0990) (0.0934) (0.1089) (0.1038) (0.2118) (0.1864) (0.4537) (0.3554) 
2 -0.0702 -0.0525 -0.0267 0.1531 0.1720 -0.0531 0.0187 0.0359 
 
(0.1047) (0.0984) (0.1112) (0.1042) (0.2118) (0.1894) (0.3572) (0.3491) 
3 0.0563 0.0597 -0.0570 -0.0147 -0.2779 -0.2898 -1.3954*** -1.0908** 
 
(0.1001) (0.0965) (0.1155) (0.0990) (0.1842) (0.1771) (0.4345) (0.4561) 
4 (post birth) 
 
-0.0474  -0.1782*  -0.2064  0.3185 
  
(0.0985)  (0.0948)  (0.1601)  (0.4327) 
5 (post birth) 
 
0.0676  -0.1233  0.0590  0.0417 
  
(0.0975)  (0.0940)  (0.1649)  (0.4859) 
6 (post birth) 
 
0.0686  -0.0560  -0.1838  -0.1287 
  
(0.0966)  (0.0965)  (0.1473)  (0.5735) 
         
Municipality f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pregnancy controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mother controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Municipality controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Number of cell observations 300,436 300,436 150,358 150,358 24,500 24,500 3,978 3,978 
Number of individuals observations 4,491,073 4,491,073 8,808,710 8,808,710 7,254,770 7,254,770 9,106,653 9,106,653 
Note: See notes of Table 28. 1
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Figure 9: Municipality Characteristics 
Fraction low-weight births Homicide rate (in the street) Average household income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The pictures report, respectively, the average fraction low-weight births (<2.5 kg), the homicide rate in public places, and household income between 2000 and 
2010. 
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Figure 10: Incidence of Low Birthweight and Homicide Rates across Municipalities 
 
Note: The figure reports the relationship between the fraction of low-weight 
births and the annual homicide rate (in the street) across all Brazilian 
municipalities. A predicted regression line is superimposed and larger circles 
correspond to larger cities. 
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Figure 11: Effect on Outcomes by Trimester since Conception 
 
Birthweight  (g.) Low birthweight (<2.500 g) Gestational length (weeks) 
   
Note: The picture reports estimated effects of local homicide rate at different points before, during and after pregnancy. Trimesters are expressed since (from) the date of 
conception denoted by 0. 
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Figure 12: Small Municipality Characteristics 
 
Fraction low-weight births Homicide rate (in the street)  
  
 
 
Note: The pictures report, respectively, the average fraction low-weight births (<2.5 kg) and the homicide 
rate in public places for municipalities of average size no greater than 5,000 inhabitants. 
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